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FUNDING IRRATIONALITY 
ADAM S. ZIMMERMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
  This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that claimants in 
class action settlement funds and other settlement funds make 
independent and rational settlement decisions. Cognitive 
psychologists and behavioral economists have long examined the way 
people make judgments and choices. Such studies show that 
decisionmakers routinely change their minds based on their view of 
the status quo, the timing of the decision, and the presence of 
seemingly irrelevant choices. Because of these cognitive biases, people 
will buy things they do not want, save too little for retirement, and 
make risky choices about their health and well-being based on the 
timing, context, and framing of the decision. 
  Applying findings from cognitive psychology, I argue that people 
will make the same kinds of irrational decisions about their settlement 
options in a large settlement fund. As a result, cognitive biases 
threaten to undermine many of the stated purposes of large settlement 
funds—to provide claimants with access, efficiency, and equity 
superior to what they could obtain in traditional litigation. 
  Accordingly, “fund designers”—judges, lawmakers, and special 
masters—should adjust settlement procedures to account for cognitive 
bias. I call this process “funding irrationality”—identifying and, in 
some cases, capitalizing on people’s cognitive biases in large 
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settlement funds by altering the context, timing, and sequence of their 
settlement options. Fund designers, however, should avoid reforms 
that unduly eliminate settlement options, or that impose excessive 
administrative costs. Rather, the benefits of any reform—preventing 
avoidable harm to irrational claimants—must outweigh the potential 
costs, including the value of client autonomy, the chance of error, and 
the burden on the courts and public administrators. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Why will over 90 percent of the plaintiffs who join class action 
settlements never claim their awards?1 Why do claimants accept 
small, predetermined cash payments from large settlement funds 
when individual evaluations offer more money? Why did more than 
half of the families affected by the September 11 attacks wait two 
years to file with the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund, 
forgoing, on average, $100,000 in lost interest?2 
There are rational explanations for each question. People may be 
too indifferent to answer a class action notice. Participants may not 
want to spend time or money to ask for individual hearings or 
examinations. And victims of the September 11 attacks may have 
been too overwhelmed to gather information or too grief-stricken to 
file early.3 But assume these decisions were not entirely rational. 
Suppose each decision was irrationally affected by the structure, 
timing, and combination of legal options made available by each 
settlement fund. Do large settlement funds capitalize on participants’ 
less than rational choices? If not, should they? 
This Article addresses a topic that has not been explored in the 
literature concerning class action settlements and public 
compensation funds. For over forty years, commentators have 
challenged large settlement funds on many different grounds. Among 
 
 1. Over 95 percent of plaintiffs join class action settlements—that is, they do not 
affirmatively opt out of the class—after receiving notice of the class action. But a similar 
percentage will never claim their awards. Compare Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The 
Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1532, 1546 (2004) (finding that “on average, less than 1 percent of class 
members opt-out” and “[t]he median percentage of class members opting out . . . is a mere 0.1 
percent”), with, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING 
PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 427–30 (2000) (finding that class action plaintiffs claimed 
awards with “considerable variation,” from less than 1 percent or 5 percent in some cases, but as 
much as 100 percent participation in settlements that automatically reimburse claimants). 
 2. Although average deceased-victim awards from the fund were approximately $2.1 
million, nearly 70 percent of victims’ families filed claims in the last few months of a two-year 
filing period. See 1 KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER 
FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 110 tbl.12, 112 tbl.14 
(2004). 
 3. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compensation, 
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 672 (2003) (“Many potential claimants delayed filing claims so as to 
obtain more information about the size of the awards from the Fund and the possibilities for 
tort recovery.”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Grief, Procedure, and Justice: The September 11th 
Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 458–59 (2003) (observing that the delay in 
filings was due to grief and trauma); David W. Chen, Applicants Rush to Meet Deadline for Sept. 
11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003, at A1. 
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other things, critics charge that large settlements ignore the economic 
interests of claimants not represented by attorneys;4 lack sufficient 
process, fairness, or transparency;5 and deny victims psychological 
benefits associated with actively participating in the litigation 
process.6 Although this Article does not quarrel with these 
conclusions, much of this literature also assumes that claimants to 
such funds make rational decisions.7 That is, many begin with the 
premise that participants weigh settlement options based on their 
own values and preferences. 
This assumption conflicts with years of cognitive psychological 
evidence showing that people do not make rational decisions.8 Since 
the early 1970s, cognitive psychologists and behavioral economists 
have examined the way people make judgments and choices.9 Such 
studies have long shown that decisionmakers routinely change their 
minds based on their view of the status quo, the timing of the 
decision, and the presence of seemingly irrelevant choices.10 As it 
turns out, when it comes to decisions, context means everything. 
 
 4. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 406–17 (2000) (explaining the 
obstacles to representative and participatory class membership); see also infra Part I.D. 
 5. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 287, 293 (2003) (“[T]he law of class actions should demand from class counsel and 
their settling defense counterparts a reasoned explanation for the choices they have made in the 
settlement agreement as well as for their rejection of relevant alternative approaches.”); Martin 
H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of 
Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1616 (2007) (arguing that modern procedural 
due process in class actions is insufficient to protect the class members’ right to litigate 
autonomously); see also infra Part I.D. 
 6. See Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Settlement of Mass Tort Claims, 
53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 204 (1990) (“[H]aving one’s day in court often leads to a 
more satisfactory claiming experience than does a swift procedure in which litigants are 
minimally involved.”); see also infra Part I.D. 
 7. For a description of the literature and definition of “rationality,” see infra Part I.C–D. 
 8. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency 
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 227–30 (1973) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, 
Availability]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1130 (1974) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty]. 
 9. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Preface to CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, at ix, ix–xi 
(Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (discussing history of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
decisionmaking theory); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for 
Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1169–70 (2003) (discussing the history of decisionmaking 
theory in cognitive psychology); Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Behavioral 
Decision Theory, 28 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 1–2 (1977) (same). 
 10. See infra Part II. 
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Take, for example, the uncanny effects of decoy options—
options that no one ever chooses but that make the alternative more 
appealing—on physical attraction.11 In a survey of 600 students, a 
behavioral economist asked subjects to rate the looks of two men. 
When asked to choose between the photographs of two equally 
attractive candidates—call one “George Clooney,” and the other, 
“Brad Pitt”—subjects were equally divided, 50 percent and 50 
percent. When another group of subjects was asked to choose 
between the two initial candidates and a third candidate, a photo-
shopped and deformed version of George Clooney, however, 75 
percent chose the unspoiled version of George Clooney and 25 
percent chose Brad Pitt.12 Although no one selected the third 
deformed option, the seemingly irrelevant introduction of an ugly 
version of George Clooney led 50 percent more students to believe 
that the original George Clooney was better looking than Brad Pitt.13 
Behavioral economists have examined seemingly irrational 
decisions, or cognitive biases, in other legal contexts—including jury 
verdicts, boilerplate consumer contracts, and individual settlement 
behavior.14 Few, however, have explored these effects in the context 
of a group settlement like a class action.15 Ironically, cognitive bias 
 
 11. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE 
OUR DECISIONS 10–15 (2008). 
 12. Id. at 11–14. 
 13. This decoy effect captures situations when the same option is evaluated more favorably 
in the presence of comparable (but inferior) options than in the absence of such options. See id. 
at 9–10; see also infra Part II.B.2. 
 14. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora’s Box?: The Costs of Options in 
Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601, 607–38 (2003) [hereinafter Guthrie, Panacea] (analyzing 
cognitive biases in negotiation and individual settlements); Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich 
& Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 290–
303 (1996) (observing cognitive bias in jury verdicts); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, 
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1226–27 (2003) 
(observing that many terms in standard form contract provisions will be “non-salient” to buyers 
because of cognitive biases designed to reduce effort in decisionmaking); see also Chris Guthrie, 
Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1120–55 (2003) 
(describing the application of cognitive psychology to a wide variety of legal doctrines, including 
tort, contract, property, antitrust law, and professional ethics). 
 15. There are some exceptions. For example, Francis McGovern briefly notes that 
“cognitive dissonance” may play a role in claimants’ perception of a large settlement fund. 
Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1361, 1384 (2005); see also id. at 1383 n.68 (noting that observers of a large fund would be more 
or less satisfied with the settlement awards based on “the well-known psychological 
phenomenon of reference points”—when reference points for an award are high based on an 
expectation of tort-like compensation, claimants may be less satisfied with “welfare-like” low 
and uniform payments). Richard Nagareda speculates that cognitive bias may influence 
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may sway individuals in large settlements even more than in other 
settings because such parties often have little independent settlement 
experience.16 To that end, this Article makes two unique claims. 
First, cognitive bias likely affects claimants in large settlement 
funds. Because of cognitive bias, claimants may settle based on the 
introduction of less desirable options, join funds they do not like and 
never claim their awards, or lose money while they put off decisions 
to file claims. As a result, cognitive bias threatens to undermine many 
of the stated goals of large settlement funds—to provide more access, 
efficiency, and equity to claimants than traditional litigation.17 
Second, large funds should adopt procedures that account for 
cognitive biases to increase the well-being18 of as many claimants as 
possible, without limiting the choices of other claimants to the fund. 
That is, they should “fund irrationality.” 
 
plaintiffs’ counsel’s case selection. He suggests that class counsel choose cases when juries are 
more likely to return high verdicts because they are affected by “hindsight bias,” and thus are 
unsympathetic to the defendants’ tortious conduct in light of the resulting injury. See RICHARD 
A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 31–33 (2007). David Dana partially 
relies on concepts from cognitive psychology to justify more expansive rights for plaintiffs to 
bring new challenges to class settlements. See David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After 
Stephenson: A Rawlsian/Behavioral Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 
EMORY L.J. 279, 284–85 (2006). No study appears to have systematically examined the effect of 
cognitive bias on claimants’ selection of options in large settlements. 
 16. Parties are less susceptible to cognitive bias when there are opportunities to learn from 
experience, when parties have access to third-party expertise (like lawyers), and when parties 
are not insulated from the consequences of their decisions. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13–29 (2007); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, 
and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 124–29 (1997) 
(observing that the presence of legal counsel—who may be experienced, repeat players—can 
mitigate potential biases in decisionmaking in settlement); cf. Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The 
Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1784–85 (1998) 
(“[P]eople advised by third parties—for example, by lawyers—are less prone to underestimate 
certain risks.”). Because claimants to large settlements are generally unassisted laypersons, large 
settlement funds are particularly compelling settings for examining the adverse impact of 
cognitive bias. 
 17. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 18. This Article borrows from Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s comprehensive 
definition of well-being. Well-being includes everything that a person may value absent the 
presence of cognitive bias—“personally held notions of fulfillment,” “sympathetic feelings for 
others,” “harms to his or her person,” “costs and inconveniences,” and “taste[s] for a notion of 
fairness.” LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 18, 21 (2002); see 
also id. at 23 n.14 (“[W]ell-being . . . [is] an actual rather than an external and conceptual state 
of existence and . . . referring to [individual] well-being . . . suggests that the actual individual in 
question . . . is the direct object of concern.”). 
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Part I of this Article briefly describes the purpose and structure 
of class action settlements and public settlement funds. Both kinds of 
settlement funds offer eligible parties interested in a group settlement 
many different options—whether to settle; when to settle; how much 
to settle for; and sometimes, what settlement process to follow. 
Cognitive scientists have long studied how people make such 
decisions. Academic commentary about public and private 
settlements has focused on other concerns, however, like ways to 
improve how judges and attorneys serve the interests of potential 
claimants.19 Much of this scholarship assumes that parties decide to 
litigate or settle based on rational calculations that maximize clear 
and stable interests.20 
As Part II explains, however, studies in cognitive psychology 
have long shown that people are irrationally influenced by the context 
in which they make decisions. Three “cognitive biases” are examined 
as relevant to large settlement funds—status quo bias (biases that 
discourage action),21 contrast bias (biases that encourage favorable 
comparisons),22 and time-inconsistent bias (biases affected by the time 
of the decision).23 Such cognitive biases have been found to influence 
 
 19. See infra Part I.D. 
 20. See infra Part I.C–D. 
 21. See infra Part II.B.1; see also, e.g., Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: 
Evidence from the Field, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 8, at 288, 294 
(describing the effect of default insurance rules on insurance decisions in New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 
1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 7–11 (1988) (describing people’s exaggerated preference for the 
status quo and coining the term “status quo bias”). 
 22. See infra Part II.B.2; see also, e.g., Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, 
Reason-Based Choice, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 8, at 597, 603 (explaining 
that an individual faced with a choice of two similar options will commonly look for attributes 
that make it possible to compare the options); Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in 
Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281, 282 (1992) 
(“In deciding whether or not to select a particular option, people commonly compare it with 
other alternatives that are currently available as well as with relevant alternatives that have 
been encountered in the past.”). 
 23. See infra Part II.B.3; see also, e.g., Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now 
or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103, 118–20 (1999) [hereinafter O’Donoghue & Rabin, Now or 
Later] (explaining a bias in decisionmaking in favor of the present); Ted O’Donoghue & 
Matthew Rabin, Procrastination in Preparing for Retirement, in BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF 
RETIREMENT ECONOMICS 125, 150 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1999) [hereinafter O’Donoghue & 
Rabin, Procrastination] (“[P]eople [planning for retirement] are very sensitive to short-term 
incentives.”). 
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many kinds of decisions,24 particularly in the area of consumer 
behavior.25 
Part II then examines how such biases may affect large 
settlement funds. Large settlements routinely resemble and employ 
large scale marketing campaigns,26 and it is not a stretch to assume 
that many uncounseled claimants to a large settlement will behave 
like consumers.27 As a result, cognitive bias may frustrate many of the 
 
 24. For example, Williams-Sonoma sold more bread-makers priced at $275 only after it 
introduced an even larger model that sold for $400. ARIELY, supra note 11, at 14–15; Itamar 
Simonson, Get Closer to Your Customers by Understanding How They Make Choices, 35 CAL. 
MGMT. REV. 68, 70 (1993); see also Simone Moran & Joachim Meyer, Using Context Effects to 
Increase a Leader’s Advantage: What Set of Alternatives Should Be Included in the Comparison 
Set?, 23 INT’L. J. RES. MARKETING 141, 142 (2006) (stating that a seller can offer an expensive 
version of a product that “is not expected to sell, but should raise the attractiveness of” the less-
expensive version). Or, consider this related example: More people will buy Apple’s newest 
$199 iPhone if it is sold for a limited time or in exclusive locations. Cf. Ravi Dhar & Stephen M. 
Nowlis, The Effect of Time Pressure on Consumer Choice Deferral, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 369, 
373 (1999) (demonstrating that limiting the availability of a product reduces the likelihood that 
a consumer will defer the choice to purchase that product). 
 25. Commentators dispute the extent to which consumers can overcome such biases 
through reflection, experience, and the assistance of others. Compare, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, 
Exchange, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803, 803, 809 
(2008) (recognizing cognitive psychology as a “major new theoretical approach to law and 
economics” but arguing that “consumers and their advisors, as well as . . . competitive 
sellers . . . close [the] information gap” through learning), with Oren Bar-Gill, Exchange, The 
Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV 749, 751, 753–54 (2008) 
(arguing that the effects of cognitive bias are evidenced when “sellers strategically respond to 
consumer misperception by redesigning their products, contracts, and pricing schemes” and 
calling for appropriate legal intervention). Notably, settlement fund claimants are even more 
likely to be swayed by bias because, unlike repeat purchasers who can learn from experience, 
claimants rarely get new chances to improve their settlement decisions. 
 26. See R. Michael Hoefges & Kent M. Lancaster, The Critical Role of Advertising Media 
Planning in Federal Rule 23 Class Action Notice, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 201, 201 
(2000) (observing that federal judges frequently use mass media advertising in class actions to 
meet legal notice requirements). Indeed, some commentators have likened the class action 
settlement process to large business transactions. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, A 
Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 419 (2001) (characterizing class action 
settlements as large business transactions that exchange bundles of legal rights for money). 
 27. Participants in large settlements are especially vulnerable to biases that have been well 
documented in studies of consumer behavior. Just like businesses, settlement funds rely on 
advertising to notify potential participants, and many funds offer the kinds of settlement options 
that would appear in a generic commercial advertisement for consumers. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(c), 23(e); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.312 (2004) (identifying the 
following as permissible methods of settlement notice: sent by mail; printed in major dailies; and 
advertised on television, radio, and the internet). Judge Barbara Rothstein, Chair of the Federal 
Judicial Center, describes the Center’s marketing-like efforts to make such notices more 
readable, “[w]ith help from linguists, communications specialists, and focus groups.” BARBARA 
J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS F. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 19 (2005); see also id. at 25 (observing the need to 
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objectives of a large settlement fund. For example, many believe that 
the right to opt out of a large settlement is necessary to ensure that a 
settlement is fair.28 Because people irrationally stick with the status 
quo, however, claimants rarely will take steps to opt out of a 
settlement, even when they otherwise may win substantial awards.29 
Moreover, many large settlements offer claimants multiple settlement 
options to accommodate the different interests of participants. Just as 
in the case of the ugly George Clooney, however, fund designers may 
push claimants to choose undesirable cash settlements over other 
more advantageous options by introducing a third, relatively inferior 
option, like a coupon with a lower cash value.30 Finally, a lengthy 
period before a filing deadline may actually encourage 
procrastination, resulting in higher administrative costs and lost 
interest to claimants with high-value claims.31 
Accordingly, Part III argues that, in some situations, judges and 
lawmakers should alter the default rules, timing, and sequence of 
options to account for cognitive biases.32 To ensure that participants 
retain a voice in the final settlement, however, fund designers should 
avoid reforms that eliminate settlement options. “Funding 
irrationality” means designing settlement funds in ways that help 
unrepresented claimants make better decisions for themselves and 
the efficient operation of the fund, without unduly limiting the 
choices of other claimants. Commentators have advocated policies 
that take advantage of bias to promote welfare in other areas of law—
calling the approach “libertarian paternalism.”33 They compare 
 
grab the reader and noting that “[a] picture of asbestos insulation products may trigger an 
association in the reader’s mind”). Similarly, the Administrative Procedure Act, which governs 
many public compensation funds, requires widespread notice of formal adjudication. See 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2006). 
 28. See infra Part I.C–D. 
 29. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 1, at 1548–50 (comparing opt-out rates for small, 
negative-value consumer claims with large mass tort claims). 
 30. See Shafir et al., supra note 22, at 600. 
 31. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 32. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 33. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 4–6 (2008); Cass R. 
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1159, 1162 (2003); see also, e.g., Colin F. Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: 
Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 
1211–14 (2003) (describing a similar approach that would influence irrational decisionmakers 
through law but that would not penalize rational actors); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 200 (2006) (advocating a legal policy concept 
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libertarian paternalism to the design of a health-conscious cafeteria: If 
people would choose to eat healthier food placed at the beginning of 
the line, one could improve eating habits and preserve options for all 
of those with a sweet-tooth by simply placing the salad bar near the 
front door.34 Funding irrationality applies a similar form of libertarian 
paternalism to account for the operation of cognitive biases in large 
settlement funds. 
Part III then addresses possible objections to funding 
irrationality including the argument that fund designers suffer from 
their own biases, the concern that such procedures may limit 
claimants’ rights to control their own litigation, and the fact that 
funding irrationality risks replacing one set of biases with new biases 
that would create even less desirable outcomes. Although these are 
valid concerns, bias in settlement funds is inevitable regardless of 
fund design. At a minimum, fund designers can understand how bias 
affects claimants, and adjust rules so that cognitive bias does not 
undermine the benefits of large settlement funds. 
I.  CLASS ACTION AND PUBLIC SETTLEMENT FUNDS 
Class action settlements and public settlement funds are two of 
the most prominent forms of claim resolution in the United States.35 
Few studies have compared the substantive and procedural options 
made available in large settlement funds, in part because they are 
creatures of private negotiations or special legislation.36 Accordingly, 
this Part briefly surveys common goals and settlement options in large 
funds and shows how the design of large funds incorrectly assumes 
that claimants will make some settlement decisions rationally. This 
 
that reduces bias in rational decisionmaking and does not insulate decisionmakers from their 
choices). 
 34. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 1–5. 
 35. The most recent data on pending federal class action filings was released in September 
2004 by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. It shows that over 5,179 class 
action claims were pending in federal court as of September 2004. See LEONIDAS RALPH 
MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS: 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 400 tbl.X-4 (2004), available at http://www. 
uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/x4.pdf. 
 36. See Deborah R. Hensler, Alternative Courts? Litigation-Induced Claims Resolution 
Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1429, 1433 (2005) (finding a “dizzying array” of fund designs, and 
observing that there has been no “systematic data collection” regarding the variety of fund 
designs, the reasons why fund designers have adopted some designs over others, or the 
“outcomes for claimants and funders of different design decisions”). 
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Part then demonstrates that the scholarly commentary on large 
settlements rests on the same faulty assumption. 
A. Class Action Settlement Funds 
Class actions allow a representative, with the assistance of 
counsel, to assert or defend claims on behalf of other persons who 
share a common interest.37 Since the 1966 Amendments to the rules 
governing class actions in federal court, judges have increasingly 
certified “settlement only class actions,” simultaneously approving 
both a class action and a massive settlement on behalf of its 
members.38 When representative parties agree to settle on behalf of 
the class, the court can certify the class for settlement so long as the 
settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”39 Generally, absent 
members of the class are entitled to both reasonable notice of the 
class action and a chance to exclude themselves from—or opt out 
of—the class.40 Three identifiable policies behind class actions—
access, efficiency, and equity41—provide a background for 
understanding the structure of class action settlements. 
Large private settlements provide more access to the legal system 
by enabling the resolution of claims that otherwise would not be 
brought in individual litigation. Class certification is thought to enable 
litigation when damages are too small for individuals to justify the 
high costs of retaining counsel.42 In cases involving large damages, the 
 
 37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 38. See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 22–25; THOMAS E. WILLGING, LAURAL L. 
HOOPER & ROBERT J. NIEMIC, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 61–62 
(1996) (noting the large number of settlement class actions in the districts studied). 
 39. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). Although the rule does not include more specific factors to 
determine that a settlement is fair, federal courts have developed a common set of factors, 
which include: (1) likelihood of recovery, or likelihood of success; (2) amount and nature of 
discovery or evidence; (3) settlement terms and conditions; (4) recommendation and experience 
of counsel; (5) future expense and likely duration of litigation; (6) recommendation of neutral 
parties, if any; (7) the number of objectors and the nature of objections; and (8) the presence of 
good faith and the absence of collusion. See 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:43 (4th ed. 2002). 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
 41. See, e.g., id. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (observing that Rule 23(b)(3) 
“encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and 
expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing 
procedural fairness”). 
 42. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“A class action solves 
this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth 
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class action device may also provide more access by granting plaintiffs 
the same economies of scale as well-financed defendants.43 In both 
cases, access theoretically serves an important democratic function, 
allowing groups of individuals to collectively petition and redress 
widespread harm. Class action settlements thus provide participants 
opportunities for “transformative exchanges about . . . social and 
moral values.”44 
Class action settlements are also theoretically more efficient than 
traditional litigation. Class actions eliminate the time and expense 
associated with traditional one-on-one litigation, which otherwise 
involves months or years of the “same witnesses, exhibits and issues 
from trial to trial.”45 And large settlements efficiently deter bad actors 
by holding large corporate defendants accountable for wide and 
diffuse harms that are too costly to be prosecuted through individual 
litigation.46 In other words, class action settlements provide an 
opportunity to fulfill the compensatory goals of the tort system “more 
consistently and completely,” and create a “deterrent effect” that 
equals the “magnitude of the harm.”47 
 
someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 
344 (7th Cir. 1997))). 
 43. See David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost 
Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 27–30 (arguing for aggregative procedures to allow 
plaintiffs’ counsel to make an optimal investment in the litigation); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort 
Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 397–400 
(2000) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions] (explaining how aggregating classable 
claims creates economies of scale favorable to plaintiffs). 
 44. Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the 
Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 382 (1996) 
(summarizing democratic theories involving access to litigation). 
 45. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting lower court 
opinion) (granting certification of a class action involving asbestos). See generally JACK B. 
WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS 
ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 135–36 (1995) (noting that 
economies of scale reduce discovery and expert fees); William Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass 
Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837, 837–38 (1995) (explaining 
how class actions are seen as a remedy to duplicative litigation activity). 
 46. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 174 (2008) (observing that the procedural benefits include a substantial 
reduction in costs of “discovery, retention of experts, legal research and legal fees”); see also 
THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., APPENDIX C: MASS TORTS PROBLEMS AND 
PROPOSALS: A REPORT TO THE MASS TORTS WORKING GROUP 20 (1999) (observing that 
grouping claims provides “an opportunity to correct more systematically the harms that 
products have caused, [and] to meet more consistently and completely the compensation goals 
of the tort system”); Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions, supra note 43, at 393–94. 
 47. WILLGING, supra note 46, at 20. 
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Finally, class action settlements are theoretically more equitable 
because they provide for more remedies to more claimants than 
traditional litigation. A class action settlement seeks to maximize 
recovery and provides procedures to ensure that the settlement award 
reflects the individual claims and interests of the members of the class 
action.48 Class action settlements, like individual settlements, allow 
parties to explore new options in ways not available in court. Parties 
may bargain for nonpecuniary awards (medical monitoring, coupons, 
and warrantees)49 or different settlement procedures (predetermined 
awards or individual evaluations).50 At the same time, class action 
settlements seek to split the pie more fairly when defendants with 
limited funds are accused of massive harm.51 In such cases, without a 
 
 48. Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 
42–46 (1993) (articulating a “mixed-model” of fairness that balances the utilitarian interest in 
maximizing the total recovery for the class against the defendants’ cost structure and the need to 
ensure that the settlement does not unfairly exclude individual members of the class). The idea 
that funds should compensate as many eligible claimants as equitably as possible is also 
reflected in the claim settlement procedures of many mass tort settlements forged through class 
actions and bankruptcy. See, e.g., NAT’L GYPSUM CO. BODILY INJURY TRUST, FIRST AMENDED 
CLAIMS RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 1 (2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“[T]he NGC 
Bodily Injury Trust shall treat similar claims with similar circumstances as equivalently as 
possible.”); UNR INDUS. INC. ASBESTOS-DISEASE CLAIMS TRUST, ANNEX B TO THE 
PROPOSED TRUST AGREEMENT: ASBESTOS-DISEASE CLAIMS RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 134–
35 (1990) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“The purpose of the Procedures is to provide 
fair payment to all persons . . . . [S]ettlements shall be favored over all other forms of claim 
resolution, and the lowest feasible transaction costs shall be incurred in order to conserve 
resources and ensure, as much as possible, substantially equal payment for all valid claims.”); 
MANVILLE PERS. INJ. SETTLEMENT TRUST, TRUST DISTRIBUTION PROCESS 1 (1988) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (“The goal of the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust . . . is 
to treat all claimants equitably.”). 
 49. See Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 101–07 (1998) (developing a “typology” of in-kind awards used in 
class action settlements that includes (1) coupons, (2) securities, (3) medical monitoring for 
future harm, (4) funds in which unclaimed settlement funds return to the defendant, and (5) 
“fluid recovery” schemes in which unclaimed settlement funds are distributed to organizations 
other than injured class members). 
 50. See Alexander, supra note 3, at 681 (observing that the opportunity for claimants to 
“testify about the consequences of the events and to express their rage, frustration, and sorrow 
could be a constructive and desirable function of claims administration”); Kenneth R. Feinberg, 
The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 94 (1990) (recognizing 
that the range of procedures in a compensation fund may range from a simple, workers’ 
compensation–like system, which issues predetermined awards based on limited characteristics 
of the claim, to more complex and individualized processes). 
 51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B); Arthur R. Miller, An Overview of Federal Class 
Actions: Past, Present, and Future, 4 JUST. SYS. J. 197, 211 (1977) (“The paradigm Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) case is one in which there are multiple claimants to a limited fund . . . [and t]here is 
ZIMMERMAN IN FINAL 3/8/2010  5:53:35 PM 
1118 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1105 
class action, the first claimants to bring lawsuits might receive 
astronomical awards, and other victims might receive nothing.52 
B. Public Compensation Funds 
Public compensation funds also compensate for widespread 
harm, but are created by formal legislation or administrative 
regulation. Although modern, high-profile examples of public 
compensation funds, like the September 11 Victim Compensation 
Fund, have been described as sui generis,53 public compensation funds 
have been used throughout American history to compensate classes 
of people injured by wars, natural disasters, or other calamities.54 
In the early days of the Republic, individuals privately petitioned 
Congress for tax, debt, and disaster relief.55 By the early 1820s, private 
bills were gradually replaced by general statutes aimed to benefit 
whole classes of potential victims. Under such statutes, commissioners 
oversaw large public funds that resembled modern administrative 
agencies. Commissioners often had broad discretion to evaluate 
claims, accept evidence, and distribute money according to defined 
 
a risk, if litigants are allowed to proceed on an individual basis, that those who sue first will 
deplete the fund and leave nothing for the late-comers.”). 
 52. Many of the goals of class action settlements, particularly in mass tort cases, may also 
be accomplished in bankruptcy. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort 
Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 681–82 (1989) (analyzing the mechanics of estimating total 
claims and providing different options to claimants); Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle 
for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 2048 (2000) 
(same); Douglas G. Smith, Resolution of Mass Tort Claims in the Bankruptcy System, 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1613, 1615 (2008) (describing bankruptcy proceedings as an important tool in 
mass tort cases). For a comparison of settlement funds accomplished through bankruptcy and 
class actions, see ELIZABETH GIBSON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE STUDIES OF MASS TORT 
LIMITED FUND CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS & BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS (2000), 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/MassTort.pdf/$file/MassTort.pdf. For this 
reason, this Article refers to “class action settlement funds” and “private settlement funds” 
interchangeably. 
 53. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 3, at 460; Erin G. Holt, Note, The September 11 Victim 
Compensation Fund: Legislative Justice Sui Generis, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 513, 513 
(2004). 
 54. See, e.g., 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1000–02 (1794) (delegating authority to the President to 
establish a commission for the distribution of relief following the Whiskey Rebellion); Act of 
April 9, 1816, ch. 40, 3 Stat. 261 (1816) (indemnifying private property losses in the War of 
1812). 
 55. See Michele L. Landis, Note, “Let Me Next Time Be ‘Tried by Fire’”: Disaster Relief and 
the Origins of the American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 967, 975–81 (1998) 
(describing private petitioning of Congress early in American history). 
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eligibility criteria.56 Early examples include public funds created in the 
wake of the Whiskey Rebellion,57 the Haitian “slave insurrection,”58 
and the War of 1812.59 
Today, public compensation schemes may be permanent—like 
workers compensation, no-fault automobile insurance, and national 
flood insurance.60 They may be overseen by administrative agencies 
charged with distributing fines assessed against violators to victims of 
fraud, environmental damage, or other types of harm.61 Or they may 
be public settlement funds, narrowly designed to induce people to opt 
out of traditional litigation and join an alternative dispute system, like 
the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund;62 the National Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program;63 or, more recently, the Minnesota 
Bridge Collapse Emergency Relief Fund.64 Public settlement funds are 
different from other kinds of public compensation funds because they 
require the claimant to waive the right to sue in exchange for 
participating in the fund.65 Although many of the principles addressed 
in this Article are applicable to other public compensation funds, this 
 
 56. Id. at 981–89 (tracing the development of disaster relief funds from the 1790s through 
the Reconstruction Era); Michele Landis Dauber, The War of 1812, September 11th, and the 
Politics of Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 289, 290 (2003) (comparing the administrative 
efforts to compensate victims in the aftermath of the War of 1812 and September 11, 2001). 
 57. Act of Feb. 27, 1795, ch. 33, 6 Stat. 20. 
 58. Act of Feb. 12, 1794, ch. 2, 6 Stat. 13. 
 59. Act of Apr. 9, 1816, ch. 40, 3 Stat. 261. 
 60. See, e.g., Black Lung Benefits Act, 26 U.S.C. § 9501 (2006); Longshore and Harbor 
Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–50 (2006); National Flood Insurance Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4001–129 (2006). 
 61. Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of 
Administrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 952 (describing the increasing 
role of administrative agencies, like the FTC, SEC, and EPA, to provide compensation through 
“disgorgement, mediation, settlement, and other techniques”). 
 62. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. 107-42, §§ 401–07, 115 
Stat. 230, 237–41 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)). 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11 (2006). 
 64. See Minnesota Emergency Relief Fund, 2008 Minn. Laws, ch. 288 (codified at MINN. 
STAT. §§ 3.7391–.7395 (2008)). Other examples of such settlement programs include the Ricky 
Ray Hemophilia Relief Fund Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300c-22 note (2006), establishing a $750,000,000 
fund to pay $100,000 worth of “compassionate payments,” and the Energy Employees 
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7384–85s-15 (2006), 
compensating Department of Energy nuclear weapons workers who suffered occupational 
illnesses as a result of exposure. 
 65. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note sec. 405(c)(3)(B)(i) (conditioning eligibility on a waiver 
of “the right to file a civil action (or to be a party to an action) in any Federal or State court for 
damages sustained as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001”). 
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Article principally addresses public settlement funds and class action 
settlement funds. 
Like class action settlement funds, public settlement funds are 
designed to provide more access, efficiency, and equity than 
traditional litigation.66 But private and public settlement funds share 
at least two other important features. First, both are settlements, and 
accordingly, offer awards only if the claimant waives his or her right 
to litigate. Second, both provide the details of settlements directly to 
potential claimants, who, for various reasons, may not consult with 
counsel prior to making a decision to join or opt out of the fund.67 
C. Large Funds Assume Rational Decisionmaking 
All large settlement funds, including class action settlements and 
public settlements, vary significantly because they are creatures of 
private negotiation or special legislation.68 To achieve many of the 
goals that this Article highlights—increased access, efficiency, and 
equity—settlement funds offer claimants several settlement options, 
assuming that claimants will choose among them rationally. Section 1, 
below, defines “rationality” broadly to include all knowable, stable, 
and context independent preferences. Section 2 describes the ways 
such large settlement funds offer substantive, procedural, and filing 
options based on the incorrect assumption that claimants rationally 
decide among these options. 
1. Rationality Assumes Identifiable Preferences.  Rationality, as 
described in more detail below, means that a person’s preferences are 
 
 66. See, e.g., September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,274 
(interim final rule Dec. 21, 2001) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104) (“The Fund offers the eligible 
claimant an alternative to litigation. To succeed in the courtroom, a victim of the September 11 
tragedy, or his or her representative, would be compelled to litigate, probably for many years at 
excessive cost, and with all the uncertainty of result which is part of the litigation process.”); 
U.S. Dep’t of Health Res. and Servs. Admin., National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 
http://www.hrsa.gov/Vaccinecompensation/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2010) (“The VICP was 
established to . . . maintain an accessible and efficient forum for individuals found to be injured 
by certain vaccines.”). 
 67. See, e.g., September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,280 
(“The Department believes that it is important that this Fund be accessible to potential 
claimants who have limited resources and who are not trained in the law.”) 
 68. See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 15, at 1367 (observing that the source of authority and 
funding for the facility will affect the choice of “organization, methodology, and payment 
mechanisms”). 
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at least (1) knowable, (2) stable, and (3) context independent.69 
Knowable preferences, or value maximizing preferences, require that 
decisionmakers develop preferences independently, without regard to 
the relative perception of other available options.70 Given a clear set 
of options, a person should choose the one with the highest value for 
him or her. Imagine that a person is given a restaurant menu that 
offers only chicken and steak. A person has a value maximizing 
preference if that person knows that chicken is different from steak, 
knows that he or she prefers chicken to steak, and, if all other things 
are equal, he or she will order chicken. 
Having a stable or invariant preference means that if a person 
prefers Option A to Option B he cannot simultaneously prefer 
Option B to Option A.71 A corollary to stable preferences is the idea 
of context independence.72 Context independence means that a 
person’s relative ranking of two options should not be affected by the 
addition of another irrelevant option. For example, if a person prefers 
chicken to steak, context independence means that he or she will still 
prefer chicken to steak if fish is also on the menu. 
It is worth noting that rationality also includes rational 
ignorance. There are situations in which people may rationally prefer 
not to know their own preferences—not to read forms, seek advice, 
or perform research—because the costs of doing so are too high.73 
 
 69. Gary Becker provides a traditional account of the basic assumptions that underlie 
rational decisionmaking. See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 14 (1976) (“[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who 
maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of 
information . . . .”); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the 
Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S251–54 (1986) (summarizing a hierarchy of principles 
underlying rational choices). 
 70. See Kelman et al., supra note 14, at 287–88. 
 71. Id.; see also Joel Huber, John W. Payne & Christopher Puto, Adding Asymmetrically 
Dominated Alternatives: Violations of Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis, 9 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 90, 90 (1982) (describing the basic premises of regularity). 
 72. See Kelman et al., supra note 14, at 287–88 (describing the basic premises of context 
independence). 
 73. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive 
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 832 (2006) (“Indeed, the costs of becoming 
informed may exceed the benefit, resulting in rational ignorance of hidden traps in contracts 
that competition may not dispel.”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the 
Limits of Contracts, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 243 (1995) (“For the form taker, any given form 
contract is normally a one-shot transaction. This is one reason why the costs of searching and 
deliberating on the terms or of retaining a lawyer to evaluate them will normally far exceed the 
benefits of search and processing.”). Indeed, a substantial body of law and economic literature 
in the area of consumer contracting is devoted to encouraging rational contracting based on the 
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Such preferences, however, are themselves knowable, stable, and 
context independent. 
For descriptive and normative reasons, the design of large 
settlement funds assumes that claimants meet this definition of 
rationality. Descriptively, funds offer options to claimants based on 
the assumption that claimants can effectively know and pursue their 
own goals.74 Normatively, this assumption respects individual dignity 
and autonomy.75 
2. Substantive, Procedural, and Filing Options.  Substantive, 
procedural, and filing options in large settlement funds all reflect 
these basic principles of rationality. 
First, funds offer claimants multiple substantive awards assuming 
that claimants behave rationally. Funds may simply offer claimants 
the choice to accept a settlement or retain the right to sue.76 Or large 
funds may offer claimants a choice among awards with various 
degrees of liquidity and value—like cash, coupons, extended 
warranties or in-kind awards. For example, the Apple iPod Battery 
Settlement offered many iPod owners three options: (1) opt out and 
reserve the right to sue, (2) receive a $25 dollar check, or (3) receive a 
$50 “store credit” toward the purchase of almost any Apple-branded 
product. 77 
 
assumption that consumers will not read standard form contracts. See Shmuel I. Becher, 
Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge that Is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 723, 725 n.10 (2008) (gathering scholarship critical of standard form contracting); 
Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of 
Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 273 (1990) (noting how it is rational for individuals 
to sign standard form contracts without understanding their terms due to the high costs 
involved); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 636 (1979) (arguing that 
although many consumers do not read contracts, a minority of “informed consumers” will police 
suspicious contract terms). 
 74. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 75. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 475, 510 (“[A]ll options have some positive value, and the control of 
one’s own litigation cannot be regarded as a small detail within the overall scheme of civil 
procedure.”). 
 76. For example, securities class action settlements typically only offer these two options. 
This is because securities class actions do not present the difficult questions of causation and 
injury as personal injury, antitrust, and consumer protection claims. 
 77. See Claim Form, Apple Computer, Inc.: iPod Misrepresented Battery Life, http:// 
classactionworld.com/public/showdocument.php?d=10908 (last visited Jan. 26, 2010) (explaining 
the terms of the iPod Battery Settlement). 
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Different settlement awards thus accommodate different 
claimants’ rational interests in a final settlement.78 Such options also 
expand the pie because some consumers may value an extra dollar in 
coupons more than the extra cost of those same coupons to the 
manufacturer.79 
To illustrate the traditional rationale behind multiple settlement 
options, imagine that a manufacturer sells tires that are unusually 
“prone to failure” on potholed streets.80 Potholes are far more 
common in urban areas than in the suburbs. As a result, those who 
drive primarily in urban areas will expect more damages than those 
who drive primarily in suburban areas.81 A two-option settlement—
$1,000 in coupons for four new tires or $500 in cash—promotes the 
goals of access, efficiency, and equity by capturing different claimants’ 
rational interests in the settlement: 
The coupon option will be more valuable to individuals who drive 
mainly in urban areas, whereas the cash alternative will be more 
valuable to individuals who drive primarily in suburban areas. Thus, 
the liability costs borne by the car manufacturer will naturally reflect 
the driving habits of—and therefore the harms suffered by—its 
customers.82  
Settlements that offer multiple options not only reflect people’s 
concrete values, so the argument goes, but are also more efficient and 
equitable. If the settlement used cash alone under these 
circumstances, a court or policymaker would more likely 
overestimate or underestimate damages to different kinds of 
plaintiffs.83 
Funds also offer claimants multiple settlement processes based 
on the assumption that claimants will choose rationally among the 
processes. Procedural options may include predetermined awards 
 
 78. Morawetz, supra note 48, at 42–46 (balancing the interest in maximizing the total 
recovery for the class against the defendants’ cost structure and the need to ensure that the 
settlement does not unfairly exclude individual members of the class); A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies, 23 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 653, 654 n.6 (2007) (“Intensive iPod users are more likely to experience another battery 
failure in the future and would value the store credit more than the cash alternative, whereas 
infrequent users would benefit more from the cash.”). 
 79. Morawetz, supra note 48, at 14–15. 
 80. Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 78, at 654–55. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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based on minimal evidence (like a short questionnaire or sworn 
statement), damage matrices (grids that account for the medical 
condition, age of claimant, and length of illness), or case-by-case 
award determinations based on a stronger showing (receipts, medical 
records, live testimony).84 Such procedural options are commonly 
used in mass tort and fraud cases in which evidentiary problems 
require more stringent procedures to assess higher damage awards.85 
As in the failing tire example, procedural options are thought to 
promote access, efficiency, and equity when claimants are offered a 
rational choice between administratively inexpensive settlement 
procedures and more expensive and individual settlement 
procedures.86 A person who chooses the administratively efficient 
option may do so because he or she is too busy or does not want to 
wait for an individualized determination, whereas another person 
who opts for an individualized determination may be more willing to 
expend the time and effort to get more money and have more say in 
the final outcome.87 
For example, sample notice forms published by the Federal 
Judicial Center imagine two procedural options for eligible claimants 
to a mass tort settlement.88 Claimants may choose between a process 
that offers a predetermined award, like $1,000, and a more 
individualized process that allows them to present more evidence for 
 
 84. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 543 F.3d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 2008) (utilizing 
matrices of injury to determine payout). 
 85. See Feinberg, supra note 50, at 94 (observing that the selection of an “appropriate 
procedural mechanism for distributing money is closely tied to the issue of valuation of claims”); 
see also, e.g., NAT’L GYPSUM CO. BODILY INJURY TRUST, supra note 48, at 2 (providing that 
claimants may seek expedited review and payment (“ER”) or individual review and payment 
(“IR”)). 
 86. See 1 FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 2 (“Had the Fund opted to curtail access or failed to 
offer explanations . . . some portion of claimants would likely have been sufficiently 
uncomfortable or uncertain to commit to the Fund.”); Resnick, supra note 44, at 371 (citing a 
study of court-annexed arbitration and noting that the most “frequently cited objective of lay 
litigants . . . in adjudicatory proceedings was to ‘tell my side of the story’”). 
 87. See Kenneth Feinberg, The Building Blocks of Successful Victim Compensation 
Programs, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 273, 274–75 (2005) (“If you tell 9/11 families, ‘You 
get an award; that’s it, you can’t go to court,’ every intuitive bone in my body says, ‘That won’t 
work. . . .’ You must give claimants a sense that they are involved in the process. This idea that 
an award will come on down from on high and you’ll take it and like it doesn’t sit well with 
families or with any consumer of a designed program.”). 
 88. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., “ILLUSTRATIVE” FORMS OF CLASS ACTION NOTICES: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION AND SETTLEMENT: FULL NOTICE 6 (2003), http:// 
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ClaAct04.pdf/$file/ClaAct04.pdf. 
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a higher amount. Both are common procedural options in mass tort 
settlement funds.89 
Figure 1.  Federal Judicial Center Sample Notice90 
     
Finally, a settlement fund may also provide claimants with 
different default rules and deadlines for filing with the fund based on 
the assumption that claimants will act rationally. Large settlement 
funds may require claimants to opt out of a fund, or, less frequently, 
to opt in.91 Rules may also require participants to make settlement 
decisions at various times in the litigation process—sometimes before 
a final settlement amount has been determined and other times a year 
or two after the final settlement has been determined.92 
 
 89. Id. Similarly, the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund offered victims’ families 
two procedural alternatives. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.31 (2009) (Procedure for Claims Evaluation). 
Those who selected “Track A” were entitled to an administrative determination of a wrongful 
death and estate award based on a limited number of factors in 45 days. Id. § 104.31(1) 
(describing the “Track A” process). Those who selected “Track B” were entitled to submit 
more information and attend a hearing before the Special Master or his designee within 120 
days. Id. § 104.31(2) (describing the “Track B” process). 
 90. This Figure comes from a Federal Judicial Center sample form. See FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., supra note 88, at 6. 
 91. Opt-in class actions also exist in limited contexts, like in employment and labor 
litigation. See, e.g., Age Discrimination and Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006); Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2006). Since 1966, however, class action settlements 
generally require that participants affirmatively opt out of most settlements either before or 
after terms of the settlement have been reached. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), 23(e). 
Notwithstanding the fact that opt-in class actions are rare under federal and state law, some 
commentators have recommended that class action rules formally require parties to opt in. See 
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 476–77 (describing recommendations to change 
Rule 23 to an opt-in process). 
 92. Class action settlements may require that claimants file anywhere from sixty days after 
receipt of a class action notice to two years after receipt of the notice. Compare Claim Form, 
supra note 77, with In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 745 (E.D. Va. 1988) (establishing a nine-
month deadline), and In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 319 F. Supp. 2d 301, 302 (E.D.N.Y. 
2004) (establishing a lengthy deadline in light of the difficulty of identifying claims). The 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program offers parties the opportunity to opt out of the 
traditional litigation system, in some cases, as early as 240 days. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(b)(1) 
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Default rules and deadlines promote efficiency by giving 
claimants rational incentives to enter into a binding settlement, 
without completely eliminating participants’ right to access the courts. 
For example, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), the 
opt-out rule, which automatically binds parties to the outcome of the 
lawsuit unless they absent themselves from the class, seeks to 
efficiently resolve the dispute once and for all. At the same time, the 
right to opt out of a settlement fund serves an important democratic 
principle, preserving the right to a jury trial.93 
Courts have long considered a small number of opt outs and 
objections as a sign that a large settlement equitably reflects the 
values of the participants.94 Many consider the right to opt out of a 
fund as critical to ensuring that large settlements are “fair, reasonable 
and adequate.”95 When few people affirmatively opt out or object to a 
settlement, courts and administrators assume that the fund 
 
(2006). The September 11 Victim Compensation Fund, by contrast, gave claimants two years to 
opt into the fund. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note sec. 405(a)(3) (2006). The Ricky Ray Hemophilia 
Relief Fund gave claimants three years to opt into the fund. See 42 U.S.C. § 300c-22 note sec. 
105 (2006). 
 93. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846–47 (1999) (observing that class 
actions that do not permit claimants to opt out defy the “day-in-court” ideal); Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (observing that due process requires that “at a 
minimum . . . an absent plaintiff [must] be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from 
the class”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1447, 1465 (1995) (highlighting the importance of the right to opt out 
in mass tort cases). 
 94. See, e.g., Deloach v. Philip Morris Co., No. 1:00CV01235, 2003 WL 230949907, at *11 
(M.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2003) (finding that the small number of claimants who chose to opt out 
warranted higher than usual compensation for counsel); In re Am. Bank Note Holographics, 
Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 418, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (observing as significant that out of 5,000 notices 
“not a single objection . . . ha[d] been received”); Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. 
Supp. 2d 942, 961 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (taking judicial notice that, “despite a potential class of 
thousands—if not millions—of owners” of Toshiba laptop computers, fewer than thirty 
objections were filed in response to the “well-publicized announcement of this proposed 
Settlement Agreement”); see also 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 39, § 11:48; Christopher R. 
Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 
FLA. L. REV. 71, 87–90 (2007) (gathering cases). 
 95. Redish & Larsen, supra note 5, at 1575 (arguing that funds that do not provide an 
opportunity to opt out “should be found to be unconstitutional” except in limited 
circumstances); see also Coffee, supra note 4, at 376–77. But see Samuel Issacharoff, Governance 
and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 369 (noting that although 
the opt-out right has been recently equated with fairer settlements, historically “it has never 
been clear that the capacity to absent oneself has ever served as the key to due process 
protections”). 
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successfully represents what claimants rationally want.96 The 
effectiveness of public compensation funds, like the September 11 
Victim Compensation Fund, is also evaluated based on participation 
rates.97 
D. Criticisms and Proposed Reforms to Settlement Funds 
Most of the scholarly commentary on public and private 
settlements has not challenged the assumption that potential 
claimants are rational. Criticisms of and proposals to reform large 
settlements instead tend to fall into two camps—market-based and 
process-based critiques. Both of these kinds of critiques value litigant 
autonomy—that is, giving claimants more opportunities to make a 
rational choice between a settlement and a lawsuit. But neither of 
these critiques accounts for irrational decisionmaking and the adverse 
impact that cognitive biases may have on claimants settling with a 
large fund. 
Market-based critiques argue that the class counsel and class 
participants suffer from a principal-agent problem, like managers and 
shareholders of large corporations.98 These critiques observe that 
participants in a class settlement lack rational incentives to monitor 
the class counsel because participants have a comparatively small 
stake in the entire enterprise.99 Such commentators accordingly warn 
 
 96. See sources cited supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also John Bronsteen & 
Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1441 (2003) (arguing that 
individuals who opt out are signaling dissatisfaction with the suit and are protecting their own 
interests). 
 97. Many commentators considered the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund to be a 
success because over 97 percent of all potential victims chose to join the fund. The fund, 
however, would not have successfully attracted families without the unprecedented levels of 
assistance from lawyers providing free services. See, e.g., LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL K. STERN, 
COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS 40 n.46 (2004) (detailing the success of 
the Fund but observing that over 1,100 attorneys provided free legal services to over 1,700 Fund 
applicants); Leo Boyle, No Victim Left Behind, TRIAL, July 2004, at 66, 66 (estimating the value 
of free legal services at $350 million). 
 98. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 726 (1986) (explaining that the goal of class action reform should be to 
reduce agency costs between class counsel and its members); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic 
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1991) (arguing that class 
action attorneys operate according to their own personal interests with little oversight). 
 99. Leslie, supra note 94, at 81. Others observe that attorneys lack rational incentives to 
obtain fair settlements for their clients because attorneys may earn large attorneys’ fees by 
settling quickly. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. 
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of incentives to forge collusive or sweetheart deals with defendants.100 
They also argue that class actions involving coupon settlements, like 
the failed tire settlement, may ignore the interests of plaintiffs if the 
class counsel is paid based only upon the face value of coupons 
distributed to the class.101 And although Congress promotes public 
settlement funds—not entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys—public 
funds raise analogous concerns about the relationship between the 
participants and other would-be agents, like lawmakers in Congress.102 
Market-based critiques recommend using competition and market 
forces to ensure that funds better reflect claimants’ rational interests. 
Democratic or process-based critiques charge that large class 
action settlements lack procedural fairness and fail to give individual 
 
U. L. REV. 469, 529 (1994) (noting criticism and observing that judges should “ensure that the 
contingency fee system and the incentives that it is founded upon operate properly and are not 
distorted by the nature and size of the cases”). 
 100. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness 
and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883–89 (1987) (describing the 
possibility of “sweetheart settlements” arising for the benefit of the defendant and class 
counsel); Leslie, supra note 94, at 79–84. 
 101. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too 
Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479, 479 (1997) (articulating concerns about class counsel “selling out” 
and settling for less than reasonably possible); Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach 
to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
991, 996 (2002) (“Although the class counsel is supposed to represent the class’s interests and be 
compensated based on how well it does so, coupon settlements decouple the interests of the 
class and its counsel.”). 
 102. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in 
Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 383, 394–95 (2007) (comparing “capture” by special 
interest groups of public agencies to collusion between defense and class counsel at the expense 
of the plaintiff class). Those challenging public settlement funds argue that they are 
substantively unfair because they are the product of “rent-seeking” legislation—laws that 
provide benefits to discrete groups of businesses or private interests who have rational 
incentives to petition the government at the expense of the national interest. The September 11 
Victim Compensation Fund, for example, was criticized as a product of airline lobbyists and 
other interest groups seeking to protect themselves but ignoring other victims of terrorism. See, 
e.g., Alexander, supra note 3, at 653 (raising questions of fairness in the September 11 Victim 
Compensation Fund by asking “[w]hat distinguishes the beneficiaries of this program from 
other similarly situated persons and requires us to treat them differently”). Other public 
settlement schemes have attracted the same kind of controversy. The Price-Anderson Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2210(c) (2006), which caps damages in any single nuclear accident at $560 million, the 
National Vaccine Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -33, which imposes limits on the assertion of 
claims against vaccine manufacturers, and the proposed Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution 
Act of 2003 (“FAIR Act”), S. 1125, 108th Cong. §§ 202–04 (2003), which placed caps on 
asbestos liability for certain businesses and insurers, have all been criticized as providing 
unearned benefits to particular interest groups. 
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participants an adequate voice in the settlement.103 For example, 
members of the class action may have irreconcilable conflicts of 
interest, settlements may lack sufficient transparency or judicial 
oversight,104 and settlements may deny claimants the political and 
psychological value that comes with meaningful participation in a 
formal court process.105 Public settlement funds do not raise the same 
conflicts of interest between class counsel and claimants because they 
are administered by government agents.106 They may be procedurally 
unfair, however, because they lack the transparency, judicial 
oversight,107 and process available in traditional civil litigation.108 
 
 103. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT 24 (1993) (“The procedural 
fairness achieved by processing claims individually may sacrifice the fairness of reaching a just 
result in a timely fashion.”); Resnick, supra note 44, at 376 (“[W]hen the principal and agent are 
client and lawyer, the relationship . . . has a social and political valence.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1084–85 (1984) (arguing 
that settlement procedures are not adjudicative, but rather, the “products of a bargain between 
parties rather than of a trial and an independent judicial judgment”); Judith Resnick, Failing 
Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 545 (1986) (criticizing the 
development of large alternative compensation schemes and trusts because they empower 
private administrators to decide compensation “without providing sufficient justification of why 
they deserve expanded authority”); Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 
425 (1982) (arguing that the shift to large class action settlements transforms the judge into a 
manager and creates “opportunities for judges to use—or abuse—their power”). 
 105. See WILLGING, supra note 47, at 18 (observing that large settlements involving mass 
torts “make it more likely that individual cases will be disposed of without trial or hearing, 
raising questions of procedural unfairness in terms of satisfying litigant interests in participating 
meaningfully in resolving their cases”); Tyler, supra note 6, at 204. 
 106. Accordingly, some, like Professor Richard Nagareda, have argued that public 
compensation funds may more legitimately resolve large numbers of claims. See NAGAREDA, 
supra note 15, at 102–08 (observing that public compensation funds, because they are formed 
through public legislation, more legitimately resolve large numbers of claims than class action 
settlements, but are more rare because of the “difficulty of obtaining Congressional action”). 
 107. Schneider, supra note 3, at 499 (“With the Fund, the effectiveness of claims resolution 
has been reduced because of other factors as well, such as the complexity of the process . . . the 
discretion of the Special Master and of his decisions, and the fact that his discretion is 
unreviewable.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse: 
Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645, 645 (2008) 
(evaluating responses of claimants to the September 11 Fund and finding that “the choice to 
forego litigation required the sacrifice of important nonmonetary, civic values”); Tom R. Tyler 
& Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for Harm: Examining the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L REV. 355, 355 (2003) (observing that 
the Victim Compensation Fund violates perceptions of procedural and distributive fairness 
because rules creating the Fund were determined without “procedurally fair” mechanisms). But 
see Brian H. Bornstein & Susan Poser, Perceptions of Procedural and Distributive Justice in the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 96 (2007) 
(finding that claimants to the September 11 Fund were more satisfied with the procedural than 
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Both of these critiques value “litigant autonomy”—that is, giving 
claimants more chances to make rational choices about their 
settlement options.109 But they also assume that claimants make 
decisions based on their own preferences. They do not account for the 
way different settlement contexts may interfere with claimants’ 
abilities to make rational decisions. 
For example, funds that offer multiple settlement options not 
only reflect people’s concrete values, but are considered more 
efficient and equitable. Under either a democratic or market-based 
critique, a fund that offered claimants two options, like cash and an 
in-kind award, would be considered better than a settlement that 
offered only one of those options.110 Neither theory can account for 
the possibility that claimants may be influenced by irrelevant 
settlement alternatives. That is, neither theory contemplates that 
claimants may be irrationally influenced by the introduction of 
settlement awards that they do not intend to choose. 
Moreover, if the stakes are high enough, a minimally rational 
person should opt out of a settlement fund.111 According to a market-
based account, the opt-out right is one of the few weapons that 
claimants have to foster competition among rival attorneys and to 
improve the overall settlement.112 Citing democratic values, others 
suggest that opt-out rights “check[] the alienation and 
disempowerment that result from overreliance on lawyers.”113 Such 
accounts do not provide for the possibility that parties will not opt 
 
the substantive aspects of the Fund, and that perceptions of justice were correlated with the 
amount of compensation participants received). 
 109. See Redish & Larsen, supra note 5, at 1574 (arguing that the failure to provide opt-out 
rights generally violates “litigant autonomy,” which he describes as the freedom to control 
litigation). 
 110. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 101, at 1076 (calling coupons “gravy” when offered in 
conjunction with cash awards); Resnick et al., supra note 44, at 383 (observing that the law of 
aggregate litigation promotes values associated with process and participation by “attend[ing] to 
varying and potentially incommensurate valuations across a range of litigants”). 
 111. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 377 (recommending an enhanced right to withdraw from 
class actions as a way to improve accountability in class action settlements and comparing the 
option to the ability of a shareholder to sell into the market); George Rutherglen, Better Late 
than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 
259 (1996) (arguing that notice “can be effective in giving most class members an opportunity to 
object to the terms of settlement or to obtain individual relief”). 
 112. Coffee, supra note 4, at 427. 
 113. Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. 
REV. 65, 100 (2003); id. at 100–06 (describing democratic solutions and values of class action 
governance); see also Rutherglen, supra note 111, at 281 (arguing that “[a]n increased likelihood 
of settlement cannot come at the expense of [the claimants’] right to control their claims”). 
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out, even when the claimant knows that he benefits more from a 
private lawsuit. 
Finally, under a democratic theory, deadlines should be flexibly 
designed to afford people enough time to knowingly participate.114 
And in economic terms, an extended deadline is thought to increase 
the chance that the parties will settle, so long as plaintiffs and 
defendants place different weight on the time value of money.115 
Neither theory accounts for the effect of deadlines on 
procrastination—a phenomenon under which people voluntarily 
delay action even when they expect to be worse off for the delay. 
As demonstrated in Part II, however, decisionmakers often 
change course based upon just these factors. A person may prefer a 
settlement over a lawsuit based on an irrelevant alternative, like 
whether the fund also offers coupons or other in-kind awards. A 
person may change his or her mind to join a large settlement fund 
simply because the default is to opt out and not to opt in. Or a person 
may decide to file earlier because a rolling deadline limits filing to the 
first week of the month. 
As a result, absent some form of intervention, cognitive biases 
may frustrate the purpose of large funds to provide more access, 
efficiency, and equity than traditional litigation. As Part III also 
shows, however, there are ways to reframe options to minimize or 
accommodate the effects of cognitive errors in decisionmaking, 
without unduly eliminating options in large funds. Such libertarian 
paternalistic solutions may, in fact, complement market and process 
reforms to large settlement funds. 
 
 114. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 108, at 647–48 (arguing that, due to time constraints, 
claimants to the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund had to balance monetary rewards 
against civic values that might be won through litigation like obtaining “information,” seeking 
“accountability,” and promoting “responsive policy change”). 
 115. See Richard A. Epstein, Second Order Rationality, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 
355, 356 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (“[Rationality] presupposes that 
individuals have a stable set of preferences concerning what they desire not only in the present, 
but also in any future state of the world, and that they can choose those courses of action that will 
maximize their chances of reaching their chosen goals.” (emphasis added)); Richard A. Posner, 
An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 
420 (1973) (observing that delay increases the likelihood of settlement because, assuming higher 
borrowing costs for plaintiffs, the expected value of litigating shrinks more rapidly for the 
plaintiff than the defendant and thereby causes the plaintiff’s minimum settlement offer to 
shrink more rapidly than the defendant’s). 
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II.  BIASES IN LEGAL DECISIONMAKING 
Studies in cognitive psychology have long shown that people’s 
intuitive judgments are not “stable,” but rather are often quickly 
“constructed” based on the context of the decision.116 Intuitive 
judgments are very difficult to resist, particularly when the choice is 
unfamiliar and unassisted by counsel. Section A of this Part briefly 
discusses the cognitive psychological literature of intuitive and 
deliberative thought processes. Section B then assesses the 
implications of three biases associated with intuitive decisionmaking 
for large settlement funds. 
A. The Dual Process Model of Decisionmaking 
Cognitive psychologists and neurologists have identified two 
types of decisionmaking processes: intuitive and deliberative.117 
Intuitive decisionmaking processes, which are sometimes called 
System I processes, are intuitive, automatic, and quick, encompassing 
the types of instantaneous judgments that permit a person to 
immediately size up a situation.118 Deliberative processes, sometimes 
described as System II processes,119 describe reflective, logical, and 
self-conscious thinking. Some speculate that deliberative and intuitive 
decisionmaking arose out of separate evolutionary developmental 
processes.120 
 
 116. Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 AM. PSYCHOL. 364, 364 (1991); see also 
Kahneman, supra note 8, at ix–xvii (presenting the four main themes of decision theory). 
 117. Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Introduction to EXPERIMENTAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, 
at xviii (Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley eds., 2008) (observing that decisions result from the 
“concurrent operation of distinct cognitive ‘programs’, some of which affect our conscious 
deliberation while others are intuitive, non-conscious processes that intervene prior to conscious 
decision making”); Guthrie et al., supra note 16, at 6–9; Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, 
Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 51–60 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin 
& Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). Psychologists have described many different dual-system 
models of cognition, but they all distinguish between intuitive processes and deliberative 
processes. See Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: 
Implications for the Rationality Debate?, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra, at 421, 436–38 (observing the burgeoning dual system models). 
See generally DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov 
Trope eds., 1999) (collecting dual-process theories). 
 118. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 117, at 49; Stanovich & West, supra note 117, at 
436. 
 119. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 117, at 51. 
 120. Guthrie et al., supra note 16, at 9 n.49 (collecting literature suggesting that dual process 
models of the brain “find support from evolutionary psychology and neuropsychology”); Steven 
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Although System I processes are prone to error,121 they are 
difficult to avoid for two reasons. First, people tend to rely on such 
processes when confronted with rare decisions—the home they 
purchase, the person they marry, the risky medical procedure they 
choose. 122 Accordingly, when a decisionmaker lacks experience, and 
an important decision is required, System I processes may have a 
powerful effect. Second, even in familiar situations, people tend to 
repeat cognitive responses used in the past.123 
Repetition can correct certain error-prone processes, which is 
why practice allows people to swim, bowl, or play chess with less 
reflection.124 Moreover, deliberative processing can “override” System 
I processes under certain circumstances.125 This is why people are less 
susceptible to cognitive bias when there are opportunities to learn 
from experience or when they have access to third-party expertise, 
like lawyers, doctors, or other specialists.126 Even with expertise, 
 
G. Sapra & Paul J. Zak, Neurofinance: Bridging Psychology, Neurology, and Investor Behavior 
2–3 (Dec. 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323051 
(attributing automatic processes to early stages of evolutionary development); see also 
ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE CIVILIZED MIND 
69–72 (2001). 
 121. There are some cases in which such intuitive judgments can be remarkably accurate. 
MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 44 (2005). 
Some compare System I processes to a basketball player’s “court sense” or Patton’s “coup 
d’oeil”—literally, the “power of the glance”—to “see and make sense of the battlefield.” Id. 
(describing the “theory of thin slices”—the ability of unconscious processes to identify accurate 
patterns based on very narrow slices of experience). 
 122. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 69, at S274 (noting that most important decisions 
are unique and provide little opportunity for learning or overcoming bias). 
 123. On Amir & Jonathan Levav, Choice Construction Versus Preference Construction: The 
Instability of Preferences Learned in Context, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 145, 145 (2008) (showing 
in repeated experiments that learning through repeated decisions is “highly sensitive” to the 
structure and context of the original choice set); Dan Ariely, George Lowenstein & Drazen 
Prelec, “Coherent Arbitrariness”: Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences, 118 Q.J. 
ECON. 73, 73, 102–03 (2003) (showing participants’ repeated choices were “strongly influenced 
by arbitrary ‘anchors’ [prior cues]”). 
 124. Guthrie et al., supra note 16, at 30 nn.148–49 (gathering sources showing that System I 
processes, with appropriate opportunities for feedback, enable expert intuitive thinkers, such as 
grandmasters at chess, to make better decisions with “a minimum of time, knowledge, and 
computation”); Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 117, at 51 (arguing that System I is not 
“necessarily less capable” than System II and describing the ability of “chess masters to perceive 
the strength or weakness of chess positions instantly”). 
 125. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 117, at 51 (observing that in contrast to System I, 
which “quickly proposes intuitive answers” to problems as they arise, System II “monitors the 
quality of these proposals, which it may endorse, correct, or override”). 
 126. See, e.g., Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 16, at 124 (observing that the presence of 
legal counsel, who may be experienced repeat players, can mitigate potential biases in 
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cognitive biases also are extremely persistent and subject to 
manipulation.127 
Notably, because claimants to large settlements are generally 
unassisted laypersons, large settlement funds are particularly 
compelling settings for examining the adverse impact of System I 
cognitive errors. 
B. Biases that Impact Decisionmaking 
Three specific biases may affect claimants’ intuitive judgment in 
a large settlement fund: (1) status quo bias, (2) contrast bias, and (3) 
procrastination-related bias. This Section describes empirical studies 
of each bias and their potential impact on settlement funds. 
1. Status Quo Bias. The status quo bias refers to a party’s 
tendency to stick to the status quo even when other options increase 
an individual’s well-being. Status quo effects complicate the long-held 
belief that opt-out rules in funds ensure fairer settlements, greater 
due process, or an adequate opportunity to claim awards through the 
fund. For this reason, large funds should be designed to be more 
sensitive to the ways in which bias affects individuals’ decisionmaking 
after they have joined a group settlement, like the decision to 
complete claim forms, register objections, or evaluate other 
settlement options. 
a. Definition of the Status Quo Bias.  The status quo bias refers to 
the tendency to value the status quo over other options, even when 
those options increase individual welfare.128 In principle, a completely 
rational person will choose between alternatives based on his or her 
preferences and the potential costs of making an informed decision. 
In practice, however, simply characterizing an option as the status 
quo significantly increases the chances that a person will choose that 
alternative. 
 
decisionmaking in settlement); cf. Arlen, supra note 16, at 1780 (“Experts, such as lawyers, may 
be able to reduce the [endowment] effect by reducing people’s personal attachment to goods.”). 
 127. Guthrie et al., supra note 16, at 6–29 (summarizing the literature on tests that exploit 
cognitive biases of “anchoring,” “representativeness,” and “hindsight bias” and the results of 
such tests administered to newly appointed judges); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law 
of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 976 (2006) (describing how race operates as a System I 
influence on judgment); see also Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 
8, at 1128 (describing “systematic errors” from intuitive processes). 
 128. William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser originally coined the term “status quo 
bias.” See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 21, at 19. 
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There are several different explanations for status quo bias. One 
is omission bias.129 Omission bias is an exaggerated preference for 
inaction.130 Omission bias describes a person’s aversion to risks caused 
by his or her own actions, even when there are greater risks 
associated with inaction. For example, adults attach more weight to 
the risks of vaccinating their children than the risks of not vaccinating 
their children.131 Organ donation rates are dramatically higher in 
countries that presume people to consent to organ donation programs 
than in countries that require people to opt in to organ donation 
programs.132 Omission bias bolsters the status quo effect because a 
failure to act increases the persistence of the status quo.133 
 
 129. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 198 (1991) [hereinafter 
Kahneman et al., Endowment Effect]. Another explanation is the endowment effect. An 
endowment effect describes occasions when people value what they already have more than 
what they can have; mere possession of something enhances its value. In the now famous 
“mugs” experiment, a classroom of business students was offered a choice of coffee mugs or 
chocolate bars. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of 
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1341–42 (1990) 
[hereinafter Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests]. When asked to choose, half of the students 
chose coffee mugs, and the other half, chocolate. Another class was made the same offer after 
the mugs and chocolate were randomly distributed to the class. In the second class, only ten 
percent of the students traded their mugs and chocolate, far below what should have taken place 
given a random distribution. Id. The students only possessed the coffee mug or chocolate for a 
few seconds, not enough time to develop an emotional, habitual, or learned basis for keeping 
their items. But when polled, those who were given the mugs tended to demand a price two to 
three times greater than the price that those without mugs were willing to pay. RICHARD H. 
THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 66 (1992). 
In that short time, the subjects’ willingness to give up what they had for something of equivalent 
value had changed. Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests, supra, at 1341–42. 
 130. See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Reference Points and Omission Bias, 59 ORG. 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 475, 478–81 (1994) (examining the possible causes of 
status quo and other biases); Maurice Schweitzer, Disentangling Status Quo and Omission 
Effects: An Experimental Analysis, 58 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 457, 459 (1994) (explaining causes of status quo bias and omission bias). The 
converse of omission bias is action bias, when people take excessive preventative action to avoid 
low-probability but high-consequence events, like acts of terrorism or airplane crashes. See Cass 
R. Sunstein & Richard Zeckhauser, Overreaction to Fearsome Risks 3 (Harv. Univ. Law Sch. 
Prog. on Risk Regulation. Paper No. 08-17, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319881. 
 131. Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Omission Bias, Individual Differences, and Normality, 
94 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 74, 75–78 (2004) (reviewing the 
literature on omission bias in vaccinations). 
 132. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Defaults and Donation Decisions, 78 
TRANSPLANTATION 1713, 1715 (2004) (finding donation rates of 98 percent or greater in all but 
one of the countries requiring people to opt out of organ donation plans, but 27.5 percent or less 
in countries that required participant’s affirmative consent). 
 133. Some speculate that this effect is the result of “[l]oss aversion.” See, e.g., Kahneman et 
al., Endowment Effect, supra note 129, at 200. People disfavor losses more than they favor gains, 
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As a result, people make different decisions depending on how 
the status quo is characterized. For example, some commentators 
argue that status quo bias affects contracting by causing parties to 
prefer default terms or those included in a first draft of a contract.134 
Alternative investment and saving options are also significantly more 
popular when designated as the status quo or the default choice.135 
Because of the status quo effect, some commentators have advocated 
“libertarian paternalistic” ways to encourage saving. These 
commentators advocate changing the default rules to promote 
particular outcomes—like an employee’s decision to enroll in a 
401(k) retirement plan—without limiting the employee’s opportunity 
to opt out of the plan at a later time.136 
The impact of default rules on decisionmaking can be partially 
explained by rational decisionmaking. After all, there are costs 
associated with filling out forms, gathering information, seeking 
advice, and exploring other alternatives. Accordingly, a claimant may 
rationally decide that it is not worth the time, money, or potential 
opportunity cost to act. Moreover, people may be rationally 
indifferent to certain choices. Such explanations, however, do not 
fully account for the way people make decisions. People irrationally 
 
and accordingly, risk more to avoid losses than to secure gains. This is one of the reasons why 
gamblers and stockholders will risk substantial losses to break even, rather than sell shares or 
stop gambling for a comparatively small but certain loss. See Terrance Odean, Are Investors 
Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 8, at 371, 
371. Omission bias is a natural consequence of loss aversion because the disadvantages of any 
potential change loom so much larger than the advantages. 
 134. See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The 
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1587 (1998); 
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 
664–65 (1998). 
 135. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 21, at 14. 
 136. See James M. Poterba, Individual Decision Making and Risk in Defined Contribution 
Plans, 13 ELDER L.J. 285, 298–301 (2005) (discussing methods to encourage saving); see also 
Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution 
Saving Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79, 95–96 (2001) (discussing the role of default options in 
diversification). Absent automatic enrollment, studies demonstrate that only 20 percent of all 
employees take advantage of 401(k) plans in the first month, and that figure steadily increases 
to 65 percent over the course of three years. In contrast, automatic enrollment encourages 90 
percent of all employees to enroll, and that number steadily increases to 98 percent over the 
course of the year. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 109 (citing Brigitte C. Madrian & 
Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 
116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1149–225 (2001)). Automatic enrollment options are solutions commonly 
associated with “libertarian paternalism” and described in more detail in Part III, infra. See 
SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 33, at 108–11. 
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overvalue either the default option or the costs associated with 
departing from the default option.137 
Although no study has evaluated the impact of the status quo 
bias on large settlement funds, scholars have found that claimants 
exhibit an exaggerated preference for default choices in similarly 
structured no-fault automobile insurance funds. Professor Eric 
Johnson examined the status quo effects of New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania automobile insurance plans on drivers in each state.138 
Both states offered a choice between two types of virtually identical 
automobile insurance policies: a cheaper policy that restricted the 
right to sue and a more expensive policy that maintained the right. 
Both policies offered the same premiums for each plan, but New 
Jersey offered its motorists the inexpensive policy, with the right to 
opt for the more expensive policy, whereas Pennsylvania offered its 
motorists the more expensive policy, with the right to opt for the 
cheaper one. 
Consumers choosing between both policies were dramatically 
influenced by the default rule. On average, 78 percent of both New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania drivers chose the default option.139 The status 
quo effect was actually more robust in real life than in Professor 
Johnson’s hypothetical experiments of the status quo effect on test 
subjects, even though the policies came at no small cost to New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania drivers.140 Had Pennsylvania offered the same 
 
 137. THALER, supra note 129, at 66 (finding that the costs of departing from the default, in 
some cases, double the value of obtaining a good). Notably, the strength of the endowment 
effect and the status quo bias is not free from debate. See Arlen & Talley, supra note 117, at xli–
xliv (summarizing the debate over the scope of the endowment effect). See generally Charles R. 
Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay–Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment 
Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. 
ECON. REV. 530 (2005) (contesting the existence of the endowment effect). For example, 
studies have shown that subjects who are only given a voucher that can later be exchanged for a 
mug—and not the actual mug—exhibit only a weak endowment effect. See Kahneman et al., 
Experimental Tests, supra note 129, at 1344. Substantial evidence, however, also demonstrates 
that such effects may be prominent for rare decisions, when valuation is difficult. See Leaf Van 
Boven, George Loewenstein & David Dunning, Mispredicting the Endowment Effect: 
Underestimation of Owners’ Selling Prices by Buyer’s Agents, 51 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 351, 
362–64 (2003). 
 138. Eric Johnson et al., Framing Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, in 
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 8, at 224, 238. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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default option as New Jersey, the authors estimate that Pennsylvania 
drivers would have paid $200 million less for auto insurance.141 
b. The Impact of the Status Quo Bias on Large Settlement Funds.  
As this Section has explained, large settlement funds operate very 
much like the New Jersey and Pennsylvania insurance plans. Large 
settlement funds must set default rules to determine when parties are 
bound to a fund, requiring parties to opt out or opt in. Such status 
quo effects complicate the long-held belief that opt-out rights (1) 
ensure fairer settlements, (2) provide an adequate opportunity to 
claim and reject awards through the fund, and (3) offer greater due 
process. 
First, many consider the right to opt out of or object to a fund 
critical to ensuring that large settlements are “fair, reasonable and 
adequate.”142 When few people affirmatively opt out or object to a 
settlement, courts and administrators have assumed that the fund 
successfully represents what claimants rationally want.143 Because of 
this assumption, recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure grant judges more power to offer claimants “super” opt-
out rights, a second chance to opt out of a class action after the final 
terms of the settlement are disclosed. 144 
Status quo bias, however, provides a reason to be skeptical of 
reforms that allow more or less scrutiny of settlements based on the 
number of objections or opt-out filings. The status quo effect 
demonstrates that many people will join a large fund not because the 
overall settlement reflects their values and interests but because the 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Redish & Larsen, supra note 5, at 1575 (arguing that funds that do not provide an 
opportunity to opt out “should be found to be unconstitutional,” except in limited 
circumstances); see also Coffee, supra note 4, at 376–78. But see Samuel Issacharoff, Governance 
and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 369 (noting that, although 
the opt-out right has been recently equated with fairer settlements, historically “it has never 
been clear that the capacity to absent oneself has ever served as the key to due process 
protections”). 
 143. See source cited supra note 96. 
 144. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 1, at 1538–40. In 2003, the Supreme Court amended the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide district courts with discretion to reject a settlement 
“unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class members who had 
an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not do so.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); see also 
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 1, at 1538–40 (discussing the commentator’s opinions on opt-out 
rights). For a detailed discussion of so-called “back-end” opt-out rights, see generally Rhonda 
Wasserman, The Curious Complications with Back-End Opt-Out Rights, 49 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 373 (2007). 
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default rule requires parties to affirmatively opt out of or opt into a 
fund. This is the case even when claimants have valuable claims. 
Second, the status quo effect contributes to the phenomenon of 
“underclaiming” that persists in large settlements—in which parties 
refuse to opt out of a settlement, but never claim an award.145 Many 
public and private settlements require additional filings to accept or 
reject an award.146 For example, although class action settlements 
automatically include claimants in the settlement fund, such 
settlements still may require parties to complete new forms to claim 
an award, choose among substantive settlement options, or select a 
settlement process.147 Status quo bias, however, may lead large 
numbers of claimants to join funds, but never complete such forms. 
As a result, although claimants overwhelmingly join public and 
private settlements, many give up their legal rights for nothing.148 
Third, as a result, opt-out rights may raise concerns under the 
Due Process Clause. Due process theoretically requires that the 
government’s interest in promoting a large settlement fund outweigh 
the risk that a large settlement fund will “erroneous[ly] depriv[e]” 
claimants of the right to an entitlement.149 So long as claimants receive 
sufficient notice, adequate representation, and an opportunity to opt 
out of or object to a fund, it has long been assumed that large 
settlements satisfy due process.150 The government interest in large 
settlement funds is high because, as discussed in Part I, large funds 
provide more access, efficiency, and equity than traditional litigation. 
Moreover, the risk of erroneous deprivation is relatively low when 
 
 145. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 459 (surveying class action settlement funds and 
finding the fraction of funds actually disbursed was “modest to negligible” in so-called “claims-
made” settlements, in which class members are asked to come forward and claim 
compensation). 
 146. See id. at 460. 
 147. See supra Part I.C. 
 148. The litigation system itself depends on a certain amount of underclaiming to function. 
A system in which everyone filed claims for their legal grievances, it has been argued, would 
overwhelm the court system. See, e.g., SHAVELL & KAPLOW, supra note 18, at 231. Whatever 
the merits of this argument, it has less weight in the context of a class action settlement or large 
public settlement fund because such funds are designed to promote equitable and efficient 
access for a discrete class of potential litigants. 
 149. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (listing the three factors considered 
in the due process analysis). 
 150. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846–47 (1999); Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that assertion of jurisdiction over absent 
plaintiffs is consistent with the Due Process Clause because plaintiffs received notice and the 
right to opt out of class settlement). 
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claimants receive clear notice of their rights and possess a right to 
exclude themselves from the settlement fund. 
The status quo bias heightens the risk that people will fail to opt 
out of a large fund even when they would like to do so because they 
have suffered a substantial injury. The status quo bias thus lends force 
to those who argue that opt-out settlement funds are unconstitutional 
because people with substantial claims may inadvertently waive rights 
to a trial in exchange for participating in an undesirable class action 
settlement.151 For example, opt-out class settlements have been 
compared to criminal and civil actions where the Supreme Court has 
barred implied waivers as unconstitutional.152 In such cases, the Court 
has found that it is unfair to assume that a party voluntarily consents 
to give up a trial-related right. In any event, the Due Process Clause 
may require funds to make a greater effort to ensure that claimants 
do not inadvertently give up a settlement award after waiving the 
rights to a lawsuit. 
Many commentators understand that the default option makes a 
difference. Claimants participate more often in large settlement funds 
that ask claimants to affirmatively opt out, than those that require 
claimants to affirmatively opt in. To date, however, most 
commentators assume parties do this for rational reasons. Claimants 
may be “rationally indifferent” to their options.153 Claimants may lack 
information or may never have been notified of the existence of a 
fund.154 These descriptions of claimant behavior generally have not 
 
 151. Redish & Larsen, supra note 5, at 1616. 
 152. Id. at 1612–14 (observing that “[o]n a number of occasions, the Court has rejected 
implied waiver in the civil context”). On the other hand, the status quo bias means that the 
governmental interest in encouraging large settlements—collectively providing more access, 
efficiency, and equity than traditional litigation—is also higher than has been previously 
acknowledged. Status quo bias means that when a fund requires people to opt in to participate, 
people may systematically undervalue the benefits of a group settlement. Thus, opt-in funds 
may steer litigants away from settlements that they otherwise would like to join. Such effects 
may also punish those claimants who, although unaffected by status quo bias, are unable to 
obtain counsel: Attorneys may not undertake the risks of aggregate litigation when, because of 
the status quo bias, there are not enough claimants to make group litigation worthwhile. See 
Issacharoff, supra note 95, at 369–70 (describing plaintiff attorney investment costs in aggregate 
litigation). 
 153. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 93, at 1362–63 (arguing that “members of [a] future 
claimant class can be expected to be rationally apathetic about their future legal rights”); 
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 1, at 1562 (observing that class members “appear to be 
rationally ignorant about the qualifications of their representatives and accordingly tend to do 
nothing when offered the opportunity to opt-out or object”). 
 154. See, e.g., Todd B. Hilsee, Shannon R. Wheatman & Gina M. Intrepido, Do You Really 
Want Me to Know My Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process in Class Action Notice Is More 
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accounted for the status quo bias, which causes decisionmakers to 
systematically overvalue the default choice notwithstanding 
substantial personal or financial consequences to the decisionmaker. 
The status quo bias in class action settlements and public 
settlement funds may be unavoidable. After all, there must be a 
default rule that asks people either to affirmatively join or 
affirmatively withdraw from a large settlement fund.155 As a result, 
designers of a settlement have no choice but to select an option that 
will influence claimant decisionmaking. Changing one default option, 
however, is not always sufficient. Because of the status quo bias, 
policymakers may need to design rules that ensure that people make 
good choices after defaulting into a particular program. For example, 
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler note that, in the past decade, 
several employers have automatically enrolled new employees in 
401(k) plans with tremendous success.156 People still tend to default to 
a small withholding rate, however, which may be too low for 
retirement, or default to a single employer’s stock, which may be too 
risky.157 This is why many plans (before the market collapse in 2008) 
defaulted to mutual funds that were targeted to the average 
employee’s best interests.158 
In sum, the status quo bias provides a reason to be skeptical of 
reforms that seek to improve settlement funds based on increased 
 
than Just Plain Language: A Desire to Actually Inform, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1359, 1373–75 
(2005) (describing cases in which claimants never received notice). 
 155. Some savings plans have experimented with “forced-choice” rules, plans that force 
parties to choose to opt into the fund or opt out of a fund. SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 33, 
at 111–12. Such a system, however, is not practical for large settlements. Unlike employers, who 
can withhold pay until an employee chooses a particular option in a 401(k) plan, no similar 
incentives exist for claimants to complete forms for a large public or private settlement. 
 156. Id. at 111. More recently, commentators have demonstrated that institutions can 
encourage greater personal savings by using framing effects. See Emmanuel Saez, Details 
Matter: The Impact of Presentation and Information on the Take-up of Financial Incentives for 
Retirement Saving, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 204, 204 (2009) (finding, in a study involving 
sixty branch offices of H&R block, tax filers were more likely to contribute to IRA plans when 
an employer subsidy was characterized as a “matching contribution” than as an equivalent “tax 
credit”). 
 157. SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 33, at 112, 127–29; see also Lisa Meulbroek, Company 
Stock in Pension Plans: How Costly Is It? 27–28 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Papers Collection, 
Paper No. 02-058, 2002), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/facpubs/workingpapers/ 
papers2/0102/02-058.pdf (estimating that owning stock in one’s own employer is worth about 
half that of a diversified portfolio). 
 158. See SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 33, at 131–32 (describing plans that default 
participants into funds and managed accounts based on the participants’ age and other 
information). 
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opportunities to opt out, particularly when they demand parties to 
complete additional claim forms to receive awards. For that reason, 
large funds—like the modestly paternalistic employer retirement 
plans described by Sunstein and Thaler—should be designed to be 
more sensitive to the ways bias affects individuals’ decisionmaking 
after they have joined a group settlement, like the decision to complete 
claim forms, register objections, or evaluate other settlement options. 
These options are discussed in more depth in Part III. 
2. Contrast Bias.  Contrast bias is the irrational tendency to weigh 
one option more or less favorably when in the presence of other 
options. Contrast bias is the reason why a subject chooses George 
Clooney over Brad Pitt when the survey includes a picture of an 
“ugly” George Clooney. As set forth below, because of contrast bias, 
too many options may induce decision-conflict, causing people to 
unwittingly delay or avoid filing claims against the fund. Moreover, 
the presence of a third, “decoy” option may steer claimants to select 
comparatively more attractive, but substantively undesirable options. 
Accordingly, fund designers—judges, lawyers, and public 
administrators—must also account for how a settlement option may 
unwittingly impact a choice between cash and in-kind awards, like 
coupons and warranties, or the length of a settlement process. 
a. Definition of Contrast Bias.  Contrast bias is the irrational 
tendency to weigh an option more or less favorably depending on the 
presence of other options. Theoretically, a rational decisionmaker 
should not rank options differently simply because the options are 
described in a particular way.159 Moreover, the introduction of an 
additional choice should not alter a person’s relative valuation of 
other options.160 Marketers have long relied on just such “preference 
reversals,” however, when introducing new lines of products to 
consumers.161 Contrast bias is the reason why the patron’s choice of 
 
 159. Kelman et al., supra note 14, at 287. 
 160. For additional discussion, see supra Part I.C.1. 
 161. See, e.g., ARIELY, supra note 11, at 1–6, 8, 14 (describing contrast effects in magazine, 
real estate, and consumer sales); Moran & Meyer, supra note 24, at 142 (describing ways in 
which decoy effects can increase relative attractiveness of dominant brands); Simonson, supra 
note 24, at 70 (describing increased sales of a Williams-Sonoma bread-maker resulting from the 
introduction of a new, more expensive one). 
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chicken over steak, as discussed in Part I, changes depending on 
whether fish is also on the menu.162 
Psychologists and behavioral economists have found that 
contrast effects directly impact a wide array of decisions, including 
consumer good purchases,163 employment decisions,164 elective medical 
procedures,165 presidential elections,166 and even, whether “George 
Clooney” is better looking that “Brad Pitt.” 
There are many explanations for contrast bias. Some have 
proposed the “Cost-of-Thinking” model—suggesting that it is simply 
easier to compare similar options among a set of choices than to give 
an absolute or innate value to any particular option.167 The 
decisionmaker identifies the easier choice between two goods and 
simply ignores the third. Others believe that, just as two identical 
figures may appear to be different sizes when set against different 
backgrounds, different attributes are highlighted depending on the 
other options made available at the time of decision.168 
Contrast bias influences decisionmaking in two relevant ways. 
First, decisionmakers respond more quickly to offers that involve one 
 
 162. See Kelman et al., supra note 14, at 288–89. Of course, if the new option conveys 
relevant information about the other options, it is reasonable for people to change their 
assessments of the other options in the choice set. A person who prefers chicken over pasta 
might rationally change her preference upon learning that veal parmesan is on the menu 
because the restaurant may specialize in Italian food. Id. at 287 n.2. But if the new option does 
not convey relevant information about the food, people should not adjust their assessments. Id. 
at 287. 
 163. SHAFIR ET AL., supra note 22, at 607–11 (describing decision-conflict and asymmetric 
dominance in the sale of compact disc players, Minolta cameras, microwaves, and pens); 
Simonson & Tversky, supra note 22, at 287 (describing asymmetric dominance effects in the sale 
of Cross pens). 
 164. Scott Highhouse, Context-Dependent Selection: The Effects of Decoy and Phantom Job 
Candidates, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 68, 75 (1996). 
 165. SHAFIR ET AL., supra note 22, at 609 (describing decision-conflict and asymmetric 
dominance in medical procedures). 
 166. Yigang Pan, Sue O’Curry & Robert Pitts, The Attraction Effect and Political Choice in 
Two Elections, 4 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 85, 93–99 (1995) (finding evidence of contrast effect 
in a study of over 300 students after the reentry of H. Ross Perot into the 1992 U.S. presidential 
election). 
 167. E.g., Moran & Meyer, supra note 25, at 144. 
 168. Ravi Dhar, Stephen M. Nowlis & Steven J. Sherman, Trying Hard or Hardly Trying: 
An Analysis of Context Effects in Choice, 9 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 189, 189–90 (2000) 
(articulating two alternative explanations for contrast bias—one based on attempts to limit 
effort, the other on perceptual contrast); Sanjay Mishra, U.N. Umesh & Donald E. Stem, Jr., 
Antecedents of the Attraction Effect: An Information-Processing Approach, 30 J. MARKETING 
RES. 331, 332–35 (1993) (describing different explanations for contrast and decoy effects in 
consumer decisionmaking). 
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option over those that involve two attractive options—even if both 
options, taken alone, are preferable to the status quo.169 Cognitive 
psychologists and neurologists suspect that this effect, also described 
as “decision-conflict,” occurs because people tend to adhere to the 
status quo when confronted with a complex choice.170 
For example, in one study, two groups of subjects were asked to 
imagine a one-day clearance sale for two CD players—one, a popular 
Sony model offered for $99 and the other, a top-of-the-line AIWA 
player for $169.171 Of those polled, 27 percent indicated that they 
would buy the AIWA, 27 percent indicated they would buy the Sony, 
and 46 percent indicated they would defer until they learned more 
about the various models.172 Another group was then given the same 
hypothetical scenario, but informed only about the Sony model, not 
the AIWA. This time, the second cohort chose to purchase the Sony 
over deferring the purchase, 66 percent to 34 percent.173 Between the 
first and second groups, 20 percent more students decided to buy a 
CD player immediately because there was one less option.174 
Second, the addition of a third, relatively inferior option (or 
“decoy” option) often creates a more favorable impression about a 
superior, but already existing option.175 Such decoy effects have also 
 
 169. See SHAFIR ET AL., supra note 22, at 607–08; Ravi Dhar, Consumer Preference for a 
No-Choice Option, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 215, 229 (1997) (finding that people are more likely to 
choose the status quo over two equally attractive options, even if both of these options are 
individually preferred to the status quo); Jean-Baptiste Pochon et al., Functional Imaging of 
Decision Conflict, 28 J. NEUROSCIENCE 3468, 3471 (2008). 
 170. See Pochon et al., supra note 169, at 3468 (noting that there is “considerable evidence” 
demonstrating that decision-conflict between two equally attractive choices can lead to 
“suboptimal” decisions and mapping the neurobiological effects in the anterior cingulate 
cortex). 
 171. SHAFIR ET AL., supra note 22, at 607. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (observing that the addition of a “competing alternative” increased the tendency to 
delay a decision). A closely related concept to decision-conflict is “option devaluation.” See 
Guthrie, Panacea, supra note 14, at 610–14 (describing different consumer studies of “option 
devaluation”). People rate options more favorably in isolation than when those options are 
compared to other options. Id. at 608–09. 
 175. See, e.g., Huber et al., supra note 71, at 94; see also Kelman et al., supra note 14, at 290–
97 (conducting and describing studies of decoy and compromise effects in jury decisionmaking); 
Moran & Meyer, supra note 25, at 142 (describing ways in which decoy effects can increase the 
relative attractiveness of dominant brands). These types of effects can occur even when the 
third option is not clearly inferior to either of the alternatives. Douglas H. Wedell, 
Distinguishing Among Models of Contextually Induced Preference Reversals, 17 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 767, 768 (1991) (describing 
how new choices may steer decisionmakers to choose other options). 
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been documented in legal decisionmaking.176 Subjects are more willing 
to impose a sentence of community service over jail time, when the 
list of sentencing options also included counseling services.177 Subjects 
also will select different settlement outcomes when categorically 
inferior choices are included in settlement negotiations.178 
A study of individual settlement behavior illustrates how the use 
of coupons or other in-kind settlement options may influence 
claimant decisionmaking in large settlements.179 Subjects were asked 
to choose among several settlement proposals to resolve a nuisance 
lawsuit against a noisy nightclub.180 One group was asked to consider 
two settlement alternatives. The club would either: (1) pay the 
plaintiff to stay in a nice hotel each weekend and $120 a week or (2) 
reduce the noise levels.181 A separate group was then asked to 
consider three alternatives. 182 The first two options were exactly the 
same. Under the third alternative, however, the nightclub offered to 
pay the plaintiff to stay in a nice hotel each weekend, $40 in cash, and 
$85 of vouchers per week (which could be redeemed at several 
nightclubs).183 
The third option was designed to be inferior to the first; 
vouchers, cash, and a hotel stay arguably are less desirable than an 
unrestricted amount of cash and hotel for almost the same value. 
Assuming rational decisionmaking, the second group should have 
behaved very similarly to the first group. And indeed, no one 
accepted the voucher option.184 The results, however, showed the 
addition of a seemingly irrelevant third alternative significantly 
affected the decision to take the cash settlement. The popularity of 
 
 176. Guthrie, Panacea, supra note 14, at 617–21 (demonstrating effects in negotiation and 
settlement); Kelman et al., supra note 14, at 290–97 (conducting and describing studies of decoy 
and compromise effects in jury decisionmaking and settlement negotiations); Korobkin & 
Guthrie, supra note 16, at 124. 
 177. Kelman et al., supra note 14, at 296–97. 
 178. Guthrie, Panacea, supra note 14, at 619 (finding that in the two-option condition, 65 
percent of the subjects preferred to sell a commonly owned painting and 35 percent preferred to 
give it to the law partner, but in the three-option condition, only 30 percent of the subjects 
preferred to sell the painting, whereas 70 percent of the subjects preferred to give it to the 
partner). 
 179. Kelman et al., supra note 14, at 299–300. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 299. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 300 (finding that, in the three-option group, none chose the “inferior weekend 
lodging option”). 
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the hotel and $120 unrestricted cash option increased from 47 percent 
to 75 percent when the third voucher option was also included in the 
choice set.185 
Expert legal advice has been shown to minimize the effect of 
such biases.186 Accordingly, in individual settlements, some 
commentators recommend more transparent and open discussions 
between the attorney and his or her client about settlement.187 
Unfortunately, in the class action settlement context, counsel is rarely 
sought or available for such decisions. Similarly, many public 
settlement funds are, by design, meant to avoid the costs associated 
with retaining counsel. 
b. The Impact of Contrast Bias on Large Settlement Funds.  
Settlement funds ask claimants to choose from an array of options 
after joining a settlement. In some cases, settlement options are 
intended to benefit claimants with different interests. As this Section 
has demonstrated, however, too many options may induce decision-
conflict, causing people to unwittingly delay or avoid filing claims 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Although lawyers and judges appear to be subject to the same kinds of biases, see 
Guthrie at al., supra note 16, at 19–29 (cataloging studies of judicial decisionmaking), other 
studies demonstrate that lawyers were comparatively immune to contrast effects in the 
settlement context, see Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 16, at 82. It is unclear whether lawyers 
respond more rationally because they are repeat players, charged with deciding for someone 
else, or because they, on average, are more rationally minded. See James R. Bettman, Mary 
Frances Luce & John W. Payne, Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 187, 187 (1998) (describing how repeat player effects may cause consumers to act more 
rationally); Guthrie, Panacea, supra note 14, at 641 (noting that neuroscientists have “selected 
lawyers when they wished to test an occupational group that is characteristically analytical in its 
preferred mode of thought”); Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 16, at 124 (suggesting that 
lawyers may make more rational decisions because they do not have a personal stake in the 
negotiated outcome). Recent psychological evidence suggests that decisions about risky choice 
are affected by the way that people are informed about the decision. Novices make decisions 
based on information that they obtain through description with little feedback. In such cases, 
people tend to overvalue rare but risky losses. In contrast, experts who learn by experience, 
making repeat choices and receiving feedback, tend to undervalue rare but risky losses. See 
Ralph Hertwig et al., Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events on Risky Choice, 
15 PSYCH. SCI. 534, 535–36 (2004) (observing that “[p]atients’ and doctors’ decisions are often 
based on information that, though equivalent in content, comes from different sources”). 
 187. See John M.A. DePippa, How Prospect Theory Can Improve Legal Counseling, 24 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 81 passim (2001) (applying prospect theory to legal counseling); 
Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 16, at 82–83 (arguing that lawyers can promote efficiency in 
dispute resolution by following a “cognitive error approach”); Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe 
Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783 
passim (2003) (describing methods to avoid framing, representation, and other biases in 
counseling). 
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against the fund. Moreover, the interrelationship of various 
settlement options may unwittingly impact a choice between cash and 
nonpecuniary awards, like coupons and warranties, or the length and 
complexity of a settlement process. 
First, as described above, studies of decision-conflict suggest that 
when funds offer claimants two competing but attractive settlement 
alternatives, claimants may be less inclined to select either option. As 
discussed in Part I, consumer and antitrust class action settlements 
typically award different substantive settlement options, like cash or 
in-kind awards, to accommodate different interests in settlement. 
Under rational theories of choice, such options are thought to 
promote access, efficiency, and equity.188 Because of decision-conflict, 
however, some substantive options may unexpectedly discourage 
people from selecting other options, or even filing with the fund. As a 
result, in the case of in-kind awards, like coupons, a court may need 
to determine whether the introduction of a voucher discourages 
parties from accepting cash award options, after they have joined the 
fund. 
Decision-conflict has more profound implications for procedural 
options that may be available in a settlement fund. Funds based on a 
mass tort generally offer only cash settlements (or insurance 
programs, like “medical monitoring”). But as discussed in Part I, 
many mass tort funds do offer multiple procedural options. When a 
fund offers claimants a choice between an administratively simple 
process and a more sophisticated hearing process, fund designers 
have not typically accounted for the possibility that claimants may be 
discouraged from filing simply because the fund offers two procedural 
alternatives instead of one. There is no reason, however, to assume 
that the risks associated with offering claimants a choice between two 
different procedural options are not subject to the contrast effect. 
The Dalkon Shield settlement fund offered claimants four 
options: (1) a flat payment that required minimal evidence of 
eligibility but was lower in amount than other options; (2) a worker’s 
compensation–like grid that required additional evidence of eligibility 
but offered more money based upon where the claimant fell on the 
grid; (3) an individualized review that required very specific evidence 
but also promised an even higher award; or (4) deferral until the 
 
 188. One commentator has called coupons “gravy” when large settlement funds offer cash 
and coupons, so long as trial judges do not include the coupons’ face value when calculating the 
counsels’ fees. Leslie, supra note 101, at 1076. 
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claimant had assessed the full extent of her injuries.189 Claimants 
proceeding through the fund were afforded representation, which 
likely minimized any contrast bias on claimants.190 In other settlement 
funds in which attorney involvement is limited, however, such 
procedural options may adversely affect choice—by steering people 
away from the fund as a result of “decision-conflict.” 
Second, the presence of a third, decoy option may steer 
claimants to select comparatively more attractive options. This means 
that fund designers—judges, lawyers, and public administrators—
cannot review the value of each substantive award option for 
claimants in isolation. Rather, fund designers must also account for 
how each option impacts the selection of other settlement options. 
For example, judges weighing the value of a coupon may ask the 
parties to submit expert testimony that describes the rate at which 
claimants will redeem the coupon.191 The Class Action Fairness Act 
(“CAFA”) also requires courts to conduct “fairness hearings” to 
assess the quality of a settlement and the size of attorneys’ fees based 
on the value of the redeemed coupons.192 Studies in decisionmaking, 
however, show that it is not enough to estimate the value of a coupon 
based solely on how often claimants choose to redeem the coupon. 
The coupon may have a decoy effect—encouraging claimants to 
accept other options that, by comparison, seem to offer a better value 
or greater liquidity, just like the “noisy nightclub” study. 
The decision-conflict and decoy options create tension between 
policies that promote choices in a settlement fund and those that 
value access, efficiency, and equity. Although eliminating settlement 
options minimizes the potential for contrast bias,193 such a move 
 
 189. See Georgene Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found)?, 
61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617, 630–32 (1992) (describing settlement options and selection rates in 
the Dalkon Shield Settlement Trust). 
 190. An independent review of claims found that only a very small portion of claimants 
sought procedural options that did not match their injuries. See Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, 
The Dalkon Shield Settlement Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claim Resolution, 31 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 79, 134 n.275 (1997). 
 191. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 489 (observing that the monetary value of 
coupons can be estimated because “many defendants use coupons as marketing devices”). 
 192. 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006) (limiting the recovery of attorneys’ fees in “coupon 
settlements” and requiring a court hearing to address the reasonableness and adequacy of any 
“coupon settlement”). Any attorneys’ fees based on coupons “shall be based on the value to 
class members of the coupons that are redeemed.” Id. § 1712(a). 
 193. Indeed, many funds, like securities class action settlements, generally only offer one 
process for evaluating claims because they do not pose the same evidentiary issues as products 
liability cases. 
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would not serve rational claimants with a genuine interest in choosing 
one process over the other. Should a fund eliminate a second 
procedural option just because a judge fears that some claimants will 
be influenced by decision-conflict or contrast bias? Decision-conflict 
may be the price of client autonomy. 
There may be cases, however, in which decision-conflict and 
contrast bias are not acceptable in light of the purpose of such funds, 
which aim to resolve claims more efficiently, equitably, and accessibly 
than traditional litigation. Class action settlements and public 
settlement funds expensively require notice, settlement 
administrators’ fees, attorneys’ fees, and the participation of many 
government agents and processes.194 In light of the purposes and costs 
of administering large funds, there is a point at which fund designers 
should avoid creating options that dissuade people from making 
effective choices. 
When claimants are offered options in a settlement, some 
amount of bias in decisionmaking is inevitable. Claimants may be 
encouraged or discouraged from joining the fund, completing forms, 
and selecting substantive or administrative choices. At a minimum, 
courts and policymakers should be aware of the impact that multiple 
settlement options have on the reasonableness of the settlement and 
attorneys’ fees. A more difficult question is whether there are 
occasions when funds could, using libertarian paternalistic solutions, 
exploit contrast effects to steer claimants toward particular settlement 
options.195 Part III addresses whether fund designers may account for 
contrast biases without unduly limiting claimants’ choices. 
3. Procrastination Related Bias.  As discussed below, time-
inconsistent biases refer to a person’s tendency to prefer different 
tradeoffs depending on when he or she is asked. Small tastes for 
immediate gratification may cause a person to continuously postpone 
making decisions with an eye toward making them tomorrow. 
 
 194. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 468 (calculating the transaction costs in large class 
action settlements and placing the costs of notice, attorneys’ fees, and administrative costs in the 
“tens of millions of dollars”). 
 195. For example, a decoy option, like a coupon, may counter underclaiming. As discussed 
above, many claimants default into a settlement fund but never claim an award because of the 
status quo effect. The “noisy night club study,” however, suggests that a settlement fund that 
offered claimants a decoy—say $25 in cash, a $30 coupon, or the option to give up the right to a 
lawsuit in exchange for nothing—may actually induce more people to file and select the cash 
option than to let their rights expire. See infra Part III.B.4. 
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Conversely, very small short-term incentives or penalties may reduce 
procrastination. As a result, a lengthy period before a filing deadline 
may actually encourage procrastination. A rolling deadline that limits 
filing to particular times of the month or year, however, may provide 
sufficient incentives to encourage earlier action, saving administrative 
costs and interest for potential claimants to a fund. 
a. The Definition of Time-Inconsistent Preferences.  To 
procrastinate is “to voluntarily delay an intended course of action 
despite expecting to be worse off for the delay.”196 Several variables 
explain why individuals procrastinate. Two factors—time-inconsistent 
preferences and the under-appreciation of time-inconsistent 
preferences—substantially affect the decision to procrastinate. 
Rational models of choice assume that people have time-
consistent preferences. That is, a person’s relative preference for 
gratification will be the same no matter when he or she is asked.197 
The relative desire to choose watching a Bruce Springsteen concert 
over completing a term paper should not change based on the day of 
the week. Substantial evidence, however, demonstrates that people 
have time-inconsistent or present-biased preferences.198 That is, people 
systematically overvalue benefits today compared to benefits offered 
in the distant future.199 
Time-inconsistent biases are compounded by naivety and 
nonintegrated decisionmaking.200 First, many people are naïve about 
 
 196. Piers Steel, The Nature of Procrastination: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review of 
Quintessential Self-Regulatory Failure, 133 PSYCHOL. BULL. 65, 66 (2007) (broadly examining 
the psychological research on procrastination). 
 197. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J. ECON. 
121, 125 (2003). 
 198. See, e.g., George F. Lowenstein & Dražen Prelec, Preferences for Sequences of 
Outcomes, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 8, at 565, 576 (observing that “[t]he 
tacit premise has been that such judgments will reveal an individuals ‘raw’ time preference, from 
which one can then derive preferences over more complex objects. This view we now know to 
be fundamentally incorrect.”). 
 199. Shane Frederick, George Lowenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time 
Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 382 (2002); Dilip Soman et al., The 
Psychology of Intertemporal Discounting: Why Are Distant Events Valued Differently from 
Proximal Ones?, 16 MARKETING LETTERS 347, 347 (2005); Andrew J. Wistrich, Procrastination, 
Deadlines, and Statutes of Limitation, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 607, 627–30 (collecting studies 
of “intertemporal discounting” or “hyberbolic discounting”). 
 200. O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 197, at 123–24 (“[W]hether the person ever 
completes that task depends on a comparison of its immediate cost to the benefits forgone by 
brief delay, and has very little to do with either its long-run benefit or the features of other tasks 
available.”). 
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their own procrastination; they not only procrastinate, but they 
overestimate their ability to make better decisions in the future than 
in the present. One prominent theory on procrastination describes 
naïve procrastination as a choice between movies and homework.201 If 
a person has several days to write a paper, and he knows that the 
paper will take no more than a day to write, more often than not, he 
will choose to watch a Johnny Depp movie today instead of writing 
his paper. This is because he believes that tomorrow he will make a 
different decision. When tomorrow arrives, however, he again 
chooses to watch yet another Johnny Depp movie. Naïve 
procrastination describes the tendency to overestimate self-control in 
the future, and as a result, to fail to complete tasks in the present.202 
Even if the cost of completing an undesirable task is very small, the 
naïve procrastinator repeatedly chooses to wait today, because the 
task will still be completed tomorrow. 
Second, procrastination results from nonintegrated decisions—
rational decisions about costs and benefits in irrationally short 
periods of time.203 If a person had to choose to write his paper or 
watch a YouTube video for five minutes, he will rationally choose 
YouTube, the more pleasurable activity. After five minutes, he will 
rationally make the same decision again. And again. When the 
decision is viewed under a more “integrated” time horizon—four 
hours of paper writing versus four hours watching YouTube—
however, he would rationally choose to write his paper. Because 
people are susceptible to nonintegrated decisionmaking, even small 
tastes for immediate gratification, or small costs associated with a 
task, may cause a naïve person to continuously postpone making 
decisions. 
In models of procrastination and savings behavior, Professors 
Rabin and O’Donoghue demonstrate how even negligible costs can 
force people to procrastinate about even more important decisions 
 
 201. O’Donoghue & Rabin, Now or Later, supra note 23, at 118–20. 
 202. The concept of naïve procrastination is closely related to the “planning fallacy,” when 
people underestimate the time it takes to perform a task in the future, even when they know 
that they have not completed similar tasks by the predicted time in the past. See Wistrich, supra 
note 199, at 621–26 (collecting studies explaining the planning fallacy). 
 203. Camerer et al., supra note 33, at 1248–49 (describing challenges to integrated 
decisionmaking); Lowenstein & Prelec, supra note 198, at 572–76 (finding that “framing,” 
“spreading,” and “time intervals” for a set of choices over time may counter time-inconsistent 
bias); Daniel Read et al., Choice Bracketing, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 171, 191 (1999). 
ZIMMERMAN IN FINAL 3/8/2010  5:53:35 PM 
1152 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1105 
than writing term papers, like the willingness to save for retirement.204 
They posit a hypothetical investor who keeps $10,000 in a 
noninterest-bearing account but retains the opportunity to transfer 
the principal into a 5 percent interest account at any time.205 Making 
an immediate transfer increases retirement savings by $35,000, 
relative to never making the transfer.206 Taking into account the time 
value of money and transfer costs, a fully rational person would make 
the transfer immediately. 
Naïve, nonintegrated decisionmakers, however, perceive the 
decision differently. Such a person believes that she will complete the 
task tomorrow. Because the lost retirement savings from one day are 
minimal, a small taste for immediate gratification may cause her to 
put off the task of transferring the funds indefinitely. As a result, a 
person might “never make the transfer even when the immediate 
effort cost of doing so is as little as $7.”207 
The converse of this is that procrastinators will be highly 
sensitive to very small short-term incentives, or small penalties. For 
example, because of the time-inconsistent biases described above, a 
person will procrastinate unless the cost of a short delay is enough to 
overcome the desire to put off the decision until later—or, in this 
case, more than $7. Policies that make the cost of a short delay loom 
larger thus make procrastination less likely. 
Limiting opportunities to complete a transaction achieves just 
such a result. Although a single fixed deadline encourages filing on or 
near that date without any ostensible benefit for filing earlier, a 
rolling deadline that limits filing to particular times of the week, 
month, or year may encourage earlier action.208 Deadlines that require 
filing, for example, on the first day of every month force unwitting 
procrastinators to balance the added cost of procrastination—a 
 
 204. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 197, at 121, 125, 148; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 
Now or Later, supra note 23, at 111; O’Donoghue & Rabin, Procrastination, supra note 23, at 
150. 
 205. O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 197, at 127. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 128. 
 208. Dan Ariely & Klaus Westenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-
Control by Precommitment, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 219, 222 (2002) (finding that evenly spaced 
deadlines discourage procrastination and improve performance); Wistrich, supra note 199, at 
638 (reviewing the literature of procrastination and finding that it “is not just that deadlines 
matter, but also that the structure of deadlines matters”). 
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month’s loss of interest—in a more integrated fashion.209 As the first 
of the month approaches, the decisionmaker recognizes that the cost 
of delaying past the first is not a few days, but rather an entire 
month.210 
Federal Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRAs”) provide a real 
world example of how rolling deadlines may directly affect savings 
behavior. People cannot deposit funds into their IRA whenever they 
want; rather, to receive the benefit of tax deferral, they may only set 
aside a maximum amount of money by April 15 of each year.211 
Unsurprisingly, the deadline substantially impacts savings behavior. 
Although fully rational people ought to invest in IRAs as early and 
regularly as possible to avoid paying taxes on the interest earned 
during the delay, one study showed that over 45 percent invested in 
their IRAs in the following year just before the April 15 deadline. On 
the other hand, the rolling IRA deadline system encourages people to 
invest at least once a year, over the course of their working lives.212 
b. Applying Time-Inconsistent Preferences to Large Settlement 
Funds.  Time-inconsistent bias may prove costly to claimants filing 
with a fund and to the administrative operation of the fund. Although 
some settlement funds fix relatively short deadlines, requiring filing 
within three to six months of settlement, other more complicated 
mass tort funds may allow one to two years to file.213 In many cases, 
there is no overt penalty for failing to file at an earlier time. There is a 
very powerful hidden penalty, however, to claimants—the time value 
of money and potential lost interest. In mass settlements in which 
awards are high, the costs associated with delayed filings can also be 
 
 209. Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Incentives for Procrastinators, 114 Q.J. ECON. 
769, 770 (1999) (considering the role of procrastination in the context of economic incentive 
schemes). 
 210. Colin Camerer and his coauthors use the following example: 
Suppose a person has $10,000 to invest and plans to invest this money in a fund that 
will yield a 10% APR (continuously compounded). In this situation, the cost of a one 
day delay is $2.75 of interest, and therefore, a person could easily prefer making the 
investment tomorrow rather than today. Now apply the deadlines discussed above 
(she can only invest on the first of the month) and consider a person’s decision at the 
deadline. Because delay at the deadline means that the investment will not be 
implemented for (at least) thirty days, the cost of delay is now (at least) $82.53. 
Therefore, the person will be more motivated not to delay. 
Camerer et al., supra note 33, at 1248–49. 
 211. O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 197, at 151. 
 212. Id. at 152. 
 213. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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very high for administrators, who must struggle to process large 
numbers of claims filed simultaneously.214 
For example, even though average awards from the September 
11 Victim Compensation Fund exceeded $2.1 million, 70 percent of 
victims’ families filed claims in the last few months of a two-year filing 
period.215 Commentators offered rational procedural, psychological, 
and economic explanations for late filings.216 Some suggested that 
claimants needed to obtain more information before filing with a 
large settlement fund, yet others suggested that claimants needed 
additional psychological distance from the September 11 attacks 
before filing.217 These explanations, however, insufficiently accounted 
for the concentration of claims at the filing deadline. It is more likely 
that the September 11 claim filings reflected present-biased 
preferences. Special Master Ken Feinberg acknowledged the impact 
of time-inconsistent filing behavior by participants in the September 
11 Fund: 
Senator Leahy said to me: “Ken, shouldn’t we extend the program?” 
This was three months ago. Extend the program? You extend the 
program and the procrastinators will wait until the new deadline of 
the extension. That’s human nature, that’s the way it works. No, 
don’t extend the program. Well, what if some people miss the 
deadline? Then extend the program after the fact.218 
Feinberg’s plan worked. Over half of the 5,500 victims filed in 
the last month of the two-year-long operation of the fund.219 And his 
plan exploited an important cognitive bias. He imposed a “penalty”—
 
 214. See, e.g., 1 FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 75 (observing that “[i]n anticipation of the filing 
of massive numbers of claims in and around the deadline for filing, the legal staff for the last six 
months” increased from eight to twenty-nine). Attorney hours for the September 11 Victim 
Compensation Fund, from November 2001 to September 2004, exceeded 19,000 hours, totaling 
almost $7.2 million. See id. at 75 n.203. Separate totals for the last four months of the Fund are 
not publicly available. 
 215. See id. at 112 tbl.14. 
 216. See Alexander, supra note 3, at 672 (“Many potential claimants delayed filing claims so 
as to obtain more information about the size of the awards from the Fund and the possibilities 
for tort recovery.”); Hadfield, supra note 108, at 647 (evaluating responses of claimants to the 
September 11 Fund and finding that the choice to forgo litigation was not the easy choice that 
most lawyers and judges thought it would be, but rather, was a “deeply troubling trade-off 
between money and a host of nonmonetary [civic] values”); Schneider, supra note 3, at 458–59 
(observing that the delay in filings was due to grief and trauma). 
 217. Alexander, supra note 3, at 672; Schneider, supra note 3, at 458–59. 
 218. Feinberg, supra note 87, at 276. 
 219. Chen, supra note 3, at A1; see also 1 FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 112 tbl.14. 
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to borrow from Professors O’Donoghue and Rabin. In this case, the 
penalty was the severe risk that a claimant would obtain no 
compensation after December 22, 2003, and it induced a rapid spike 
in filing, as demonstrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2.  Claims Filed with the September 11 Victim Compensation 
Fund220 
 
But should Feinberg have done it differently? Assuming that 
Professors Rabin and O’Donoghue are correct, a rolling deadline that 
encouraged a claimant to file a year earlier would have yielded even 
more savings given the time value of money: approximately $105,000 
per claimant, assuming a 5 percent annual interest rate. Should fund 
designers use libertarian paternalistic solutions, like rolling deadlines, 
to encourage early filings in a settlement fund? Part III addresses 
these questions. 
III.  A NEW BEHAVIORAL FRAMEWORK 
Modern reforms to large settlements have largely focused on 
solutions that aim to increase choices as a way to make large funds 
more accessible, efficient, and fair.221 Prevailing proposals 
emphasizing choice, however, do not account for cognitive bias. As 
set forth in Part I, “super” opt-out rights not only secure claimants’ 
right to a trial but can also provide a signal that claimants approve of 
 
 220. This Figure appears in 1 FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 112 tbl.14. 
 221. See, e.g., supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
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the fund when few people affirmatively opt out. Multiple settlement 
options are supposed to provide claimants with more say in a final 
settlement, while efficiently accommodating claimants’ divergent 
interests in a final award. And typically, claimants are generously 
awarded time to weigh the economic and personal benefits of a 
settlement. 
As set forth in Part II, however, studies in decisionmaking 
strongly suggest that the structure of such choices will affect claimants 
in ways that undermine their decisions. Because of the status quo 
bias, many claimants join funds that they do not necessarily like and 
never claim their awards. Because of contrast biases, many claimants 
decide based on irrelevant settlement procedures and substantive 
awards. And because of time-inconsistent biases, claimants may lose 
money while they inadvertently put off the decision to file a claim. 
Cognitive bias thus threatens the basic goal of large funds to 
provide more access, efficiency, and equity to claimants than what the 
claimants would obtain in traditional litigation. Fund designers 
accordingly need to adopt rules that account for cognitive errors in 
decisionmaking but do not limit choices or undermine the benefits of 
a large settlement. 
As set forth in Section A below, architects of settlement funds 
may use paternalistic solutions to identify cognitive bias, and in some 
cases, channel it to benefit as many claimants as possible. Fund 
designers should not, however, adopt procedures that unduly 
eliminate settlement options for more rational claimants or impose 
excessive administrative costs on all members of the fund. Section B 
then examines the costs and benefits of four specific solutions that 
would minimize or channel the effects of cognitive bias in a 
settlement fund. 
A. Why Fund Irrationality? 
Despite their limitations, settlement funds still offer valuable 
alternatives to traditional litigation. That is, even if cognitive bias 
affects settlement decisions, such bias alone does not completely 
undermine the value of a large fund. To the extent that large funds 
provide some option for choice that some people will act upon, 
settlement funds are better than traditional litigation, which offers 
less access to counsel, imposes higher costs, and can produce less 
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equitable outcomes.222 Rather, fund designers should examine how 
they can improve settlement funds by taking steps to accommodate 
claimants whose decisions are affected by cognitive biases. 
Cognitive biases in large settlement funds merit some kind of 
legal intervention. Judges and public administrators already owe 
special obligations to ensure that a settlement process is designed 
fairly.223 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Due Process 
Clause224 require that large settlement funds be “fair, reasonable, and 
adequate”225 to prospective claimants. Judges and lawmakers, 
however, generally discharge that duty by taking steps to protect only 
rationally acting claimants—ensuring that participants’ “decision[s] to 
participate or to withdraw” are made on the basis of an “independent 
analysis of [their] own self interest.”226 Federal district courts “closely 
monitor” the notice process so that “class members are informed of 
the opportunity to exclude themselves” from the class settlement.227 
Judges may also ensure that claimants are not swayed by 
entrepreneurial lawyers who seek to sabotage the settlement and may 
police what can be said to potential claimants to ensure that they 
make unbiased decisions.228 Public administrators have similar duties 
and obligations.229 
 
 222. See supra Part I.A; see also WEINSTEIN, supra note 45, at 1 (“[L]awyers have been 
devoted to dealing with individuals and their problems on a retail basis. Modern disasters 
affecting large numbers of people make that approach impossible except at unacceptable 
transaction costs and inefficiencies that would prevent vindication of most people’s rights.”). 
 223. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981) (“[A] district court has both the duty 
and the broad authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders 
governing the conduct of counsel and parties.”). 
 224. Although due process does not require that a “legislatively enacted compensation 
scheme . . . duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy” to 
a lawsuit, see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978) 
(upholding the compensation system for nuclear accidents under the Price-Anderson Act), it 
may not be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); see also Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 300–01 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that the notice regarding the distribution of proceeds from the 
September 11 Fund did not violate due process). 
 225. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 226. See Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 723 (W.D. Ky.), appeal 
dismissed, 659 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 227. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 160 F.R.D. 478, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
 228. See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., No. CV-96-5238, 2006 WL 1025588, 
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006) (“[T]his is not a run-of-the-mill business environment, subject 
solely to market forces and the principles of contract and tort law that control behavior in that 
environment. The fact that the merchant class is huge does not alter the nature of the Court’s 
relationship with its members. . . . I have an affirmative obligation to protect those interests.”); 
Georgine, 160 F.R.D. at 498 (“The issuance of a remedial order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(d) does 
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Although courts rightly examine notices to protect rationally 
behaving claimants, such review does not guarantee that settlements 
are “fair, reasonable and adequate” to the claimants whose decisions 
are influenced by cognitive bias.230 As this Article has demonstrated, 
even the decision to opt out of or into a fund and to elect other 
settlement alternatives is not solely determined by the claimant but 
rather by the design of the fund. As yet, fund designers have no 
method to account for errors that are caused by the structure of the 
fund. 
Fund designers could eliminate settlement choices so that people 
do not err when filing with a fund. Multiple settlement processes and 
awards, however, serve important democratic and economic 
purposes. As discussed in Part I, individuals play a more significant 
role in their own redress when they choose among litigation or 
administrative procedures; parties flexibly expand the pie by selecting 
remedies otherwise unavailable in traditional litigation; and, in rare 
cases, claimants register their objections in fairness hearings or by 
opting out of the fund in large numbers.231 Those responsible for the 
design of large funds—lawyers, judges, and lawmakers—need a 
framework to determine when they should intervene to counter or 
use the effects of cognitive bias, without undermining participation in 
a large fund, or efficient compensation and deterrence. 
Professors Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler suggest that, in 
light of cognitive bias, policymakers should design options for citizens 
that both preserve liberty and maximize welfare through “libertarian 
paternalism.”232 They argue that policymakers can alter the sequence 
of options and default rules to promote policies that encourage 
 
not require a finding of actual harm. A remedy is appropriate if the communications at issue 
create a ‘likelihood’ of abuse, confusion, or an adverse effect on the administration of justice.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 229. See, e.g., 1 FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 14 (describing the dissemination of information 
to all victims, families of victims, and other interested parties as “[o]ne of the Special Master’s 
principal objectives”); see also Exec. Order No. 13,179, 3 C.F.R. 321 (2001), reprinted in 42 
U.S.C. § 7384 (2006) (requiring the Secretary of Labor to develop “informational 
materials . . . to help potential claimants understand the Program and the application process”). 
 230. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 45, at 9 (“The judge should, it is submitted, expose 
himself or herself on a person-to-person basis to the emotional and other needs of the litigants. 
This proposition requires a shift from the traditional Anglo-American jurisprudential view that 
the common law judge is an oracle on high, muffled in a black robe of anonymity, uttering the 
law and deciding the facts without involvement.”). 
 231. See supra Part I.B–C. 
 232. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 4; see id. at 3–4 (defining the concept of the 
“choice architect”). 
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people to make better decisions for themselves and for society as a 
whole, without eliminating people’s choices. For example, as 
discussed in Part II.B, an employer can encourage savings and 
maintain choice by automatically enrolling employees in an optional 
401(k) plan.233 
In this way, opt-out settlements already are a form of libertarian 
paternalism. By automatically enrolling plaintiffs in a settlement 
unless they object, opt-out settlement funds reverse the traditional 
assumption that plaintiffs cannot silently waive rights to a civil lawsuit 
to provide them with more benefits than what they would obtain in 
traditional litigation.234 Large settlement funds, however, have limited 
resources, and accordingly, are somewhat different from the 401(k) 
plans described by Professors Sunstein and Thaler.235 Measures that 
encourage more filings to improve the well-being of some claimants 
necessarily will impose a cost on other participants of the fund, who 
will receive less available compensation per person as a result of more 
filings. 
Moreover, adjusting funds to account for cognitive bias is 
extremely difficult.236 Fund designers need to be wary of creating 
systems that could themselves replace one set of biases with other 
biases that create even less desirable outcomes.237 Although 
behavioral and cognitive psychologists have found that cognitive bias 
robustly affects very similar kinds of legal decisions, there has not 
been an empirical study devoted to these effects in a large settlement 
fund. Just as the effects of cognitive bias may vary in different 
 
 233. See id.; see also supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 234. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requirements for class certification), with 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly 
associated with the surrender of constitutional rights . . . .”), and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 
95 (1972) (noting that a waiver of constitutional rights “in any context must, at the very least, be 
clear” (emphasis omitted)). 
 235. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 236. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict and Nudge: How Behavioral Economics 
Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2116 (2008) (reviewing THALER, supra note 
33, and ARIELY, supra note 11) (cautioning against overestimating the capability of “choice 
architecture” to address some forms of cognitive bias); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 225–
34 (describing potential pitfalls and objections to procedures that account for cognitive bias); 
Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 1168 (“The principle lesson of cognitive psychology is . . . that 
people develop complex, contextual strategies for making choices.”). 
 237. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 227 (describing offsetting effects of cognitive 
biases). 
ZIMMERMAN IN FINAL 3/8/2010  5:53:35 PM 
1160 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1105 
consumer markets,238 one may expect the power of cognitive bias to 
vary based on the nature of the claim. 
A modified form of paternalism, called “asymmetric 
paternalism,” takes into account such concerns.239 Asymmetric 
paternalism favors policies that benefit those prone to make cognitive 
errors, while imposing little to no cost on those who otherwise choose 
rationally. Asymmetric paternalism recognizes that studies in 
behavioral science are still developing, and accordingly, that some 
paternalistic policies may harm those who are not prone to cognitive 
bias.240 Given the lack of empirical study of cognitive bias in large 
settlement funds, a cautious approach that seeks to maximize the 
welfare of rational and irrational claimants to a fund, while 
minimizing costs, seems warranted. 
As a result, architects of settlement funds should adopt 
procedures that also balance the costs to other claimants in a 
settlement fund. Fund procedures should identify and, in some cases, 
make use of cognitive bias to benefit claimants’ welfare. Fund 
designers, however, should not adopt procedures that unduly 
eliminate settlement options for fully rational claimants, or that 
impose excessive administrative costs on all members of the fund. 
Rather, the benefits of any paternalistic solution—preventing 
avoidable harm to irrational claimants—must outweigh the potential 
costs, including the value of client autonomy, the chance of error, and 
the burden on the courts and public administrators. For example, it 
may be possible to combat status quo bias by automatically 
processing claims in large settlements involving shareholder fraud 
because fund designers may have a great deal of information about 
claimants when the awards are modest, and when claimants generally 
do not have to choose among multiple settlement options.241 Such 
solutions, however, are more problematic in large mass tort 
settlements in which awards are large, information about individual 
claimants is limited, and a greater potential for fraud exists.242 In such 
 
 238. See Bar-Gill, supra note 25, at 750–51 (observing that consumer mistakes may vary 
between different types of markets). 
 239. See Camerer et al., supra note 33, at 1211–14 (proposing the concept of “asymmetric 
paternalism” as an alternative to regulatory systems aimed at redistribution or at imposing harm 
on individuals to realize “net societal benefits”). 
 240. See id. at 1218 (recognizing the challenge of determining when applying policies that 
adjust for irrational choices would undermine rational choices). 
 241. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 242. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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cases, the costs of automatically processing claims would not be worth 
the administrative cost, the burden on the courts, and the potential 
for error. 
B. Examples of Funding Irrationality 
Legal scholars who study the effects of cognitive bias in other 
forms of legal decisionmaking have suggested three types of 
approaches to cognitive error. Such approaches may either (1) 
insulate legal outcomes from cognitive bias by barring certain 
contractual arrangements, (2) debias decisionmakers by requiring 
people to take steps to reduce bias in decisionmaking, or (3) rebias 
decisions, channeling people’s extant biases to improve settlement 
outcomes. Each solution varies in effectiveness and cost. 
Insulating solutions, although sometimes necessary, arguably 
pose the highest costs on other members of the fund because they 
impose a one-size-fits-all rule on potential claimants.243 Such rules 
may bar certain settlement options entirely, like coupons, because 
they induce decision-conflict.244 Such solutions may be very effective 
for some people, but at a minimum, require more study because they 
limit choices for rational acting claimants. 
Debiasing solutions, unlike insulating solutions, do not limit 
choices. They may not correct cognitive error as effectively in large 
settlement funds, however, as they do in other contexts. A well-
known example of debiasing occurs when litigants are asked to 
evaluate their settlement options from the other side’s perspective.245 
Although litigants tend to be subject to self-serving biases—that is, 
they optimistically view the likely outcomes of a trial in light of their 
 
 243. For example, one might argue that the business judgment rule, which limits juries’ and 
judges’ review of corporate board decisions, is an insulating legal solution. See Jolls & Sunstein, 
supra note 33, at 200 (offering the business judgment rule as an example of how the law has 
incorporated the theory of bounded rationality). This is because the rule insulates boards from 
irrational post-hoc determinations by judges and juries that may be influenced by hindsight 
bias—the tendency to review past decisions in light of recent events. Such a solution, however, 
fails to account for rationally minded judges and juries who may accurately evaluate poor board 
decisions. 
 244. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 245. See Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Creating Convergence: 
Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913, 917–21 (1997) (presenting the results 
of an experimental simulation of a lawsuit in which the “litigants” were required to evaluate the 
weaknesses of their own cases); Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 
NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1256 n.40 (2005) (“Asking . . . subjects to consider alternative or opposing 
arguments . . . has been found to ameliorate the adverse effects of several biases . . . .”). 
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own interests—scholars have found that such mental exercises 
encourage the parties to develop more accurate views of likely trial 
outcomes.246 Another form of debiasing occurs when people delegate 
certain decisions to specialists who may be less prone to make 
cognitive errors because the choice is familiar.247 
Fund designers theoretically could use language in settlement 
notices to debias settlement decisions. For example, a notice could 
highlight the costs of leaving awards unclaimed after joining a fund. 
Such a notice would encourage parties to think more carefully about 
combinations of options and to highlight the impact of a delayed 
settlement decision. Such debiasing efforts, however, may be less 
effective in settlement funds, as there is little designers can do to 
ensure that claimants will follow the instructions in their settlement 
notices. Similarly, although many funds staff toll-free hotlines to 
answer questions, there are few assurances that claimants will call 
them. 
Finally, funds could attempt to rebias, by redirecting existing 
cognitive biases to improve outcomes, without limiting choices.248 
Rebiasing solutions include changing default rules, employing rolling 
deadlines, and even including additional decoy options to affect 
claimants’ choices.249 Such options will cost claimants. Rebiasing 
requires money to monitor the effects of a potential bias and to 
administer special procedures.250 And, as a result, rebiasing may 
reduce the total available funds to rational acting claimants.251 
 
 246. See, e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 201 (describing a “long-standing literature” 
dealing with the problem of bounded rationality in “the adjudicative process”); cf. Rachlinski, 
supra note 9, at 1207–11 (describing methods to reduce bias in decisionmaking through 
“alternative representational structure[s]”). 
 247. See Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 1214–16 (describing the ways professionals offer more 
than “just knowledge” by providing a “better decisionmaking perspective”); see also Jennifer 
Arlen, Mathew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency 
Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–6 (2002) (evaluating experimental results indicating that 
corporations effectively remove biases by delegating decisions to managers). 
 248. Cf. Amir & Lobel, supra note 236, at 2114–17 (describing debiasing approaches). 
 249. See id. at 2116 (describing a program in Chicago in which city planners used decoy 
effects to reduce speeding accidents by requiring unevenly spaced street paint to create the 
illusion for drivers that they were moving faster on the highway). 
 250. See id. at 2122–23 (“[T]here must be a continuous study as to whether the chosen 
design attains its intended effect . . . .”). 
 251. See, e.g., id. at 2123–24 (describing the distributional effects of new default rules for 
customers and homebuyers on credit card companies and mortgage brokers); Epstein, supra 
note 25, at 835 (arguing that reforms to credit card markets based on cognitive biases benefit 
those at “the bottom end of the distribution, but only at a high price for everyone else”). 
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Moreover, such solutions threaten individual autonomy because they 
ultimately seek to steer parties to choose particular outcomes. 
Rebiasing, however, may be more effective than debiasing 
approaches in settlement funds because they target the intuitive 
decisionmaking of potential claimants.252 That is, they may still be 
effective, even when people miss the fine print in the settlement 
notice. 
This Section examines procedures that insulate, reduce, or 
channel cognitive biases under an asymmetrically paternalistic 
approach, one that respects the autonomy of rational decisionmakers 
but nudges those susceptible to cognitive biases toward better 
outcomes. From the least to most intrusive and costly, these 
procedures include: (1) the use of rolling deadlines to increase earlier 
filings; (2) the use of default options to reduce underclaiming; (3) 
fairness hearings that account for cognitive bias; and (4) the use of 
decoy options to reduce underclaiming. 
1. Rolling Deadlines.  Most settlement funds face spikes in filings 
as the deadline for filing claims approaches, as discussed in Part II. 
This delay places additional costs on the fund as a whole because it 
requires additional resources to timely process such claims.253 Late 
filings also may result in forgone interest for claimants, particularly in 
high stakes settlements.254 
As this Article has discussed in Part I, democratic and economic 
considerations explain some late filings. Claimants may choose to 
gather more information before filing with a large settlement fund. 
Or, particularly in large funds involving personal injuries, parties may 
need additional psychological distance from the event that gave rise 
to the claim. These explanations, however, insufficiently account for 
the concentration of claims at the filing deadline. It is more likely that 
claim filings represent present-biased preferences, as discussed in 
Part II. 
A debiasing solution could correct for such delays. Claim 
settlement notices could include information that describes the 
interest to be lost or gained by settling by a particular date. Staffers at 
fund telephone hotlines could also be provided with such information. 
 
 252. See supra Part II.A. 
 253. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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The Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)255 generally requires such 
disclosures to mortgage borrowers so that they may fully evaluate the 
true cost of a loan.256 Although such approaches could ensure that 
claimants understand the costs of delays, they do not directly penalize 
claimants or come at a large cost to the fund. It is unclear, however, 
that additional disclosures in a settlement mailing will effectively 
induce a claimant to rethink his or her decision.257 
A settlement fund could, accordingly, adopt a rebiasing solution, 
like rolling deadlines, to encourage earlier filings. Parties could be 
required to file in the first week of each month until the final 
deadline. Such a system has never been applied in large public or 
private settlement funds. Cognitive science, however, suggests that 
such short-term incentives will encourage claimants to file more often 
over the duration of the fund, saving both opportunity costs to 
claimants and administrative costs to the fund.258 
Asymmetric paternalism, of course, requires that such a solution 
take into account costs. Undoubtedly, rolling deadlines impose a cost 
on individual actors, who would suffer the inconvenience of filing at 
the beginning of the month, as well as on a large fund, which would 
have to expend additional resources making such a filing system easy 
and transparent. Those exercising fully rational behavior, however, 
would suffer marginal losses from rolling deadlines. A party unable to 
file at the beginning of the first month would always retain the ability 
to file the following month.259 A party that wants to wait for other 
strategic, information-driven, or psychological reasons would still 
retain that right.260 
 
 255. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–67f (2006). 
 256. See id. §§ 1602, 1631–32, 1637a (disclosure guidelines and obligations). TILA also 
requires that, for credit card applications sent through the mail, any annual, periodic, or 
membership fees are disclosed in a tabular format, see id. § 1632(c), known as a “Schumer Box,” 
see, e.g., Michael Schroeder, Bigger Print for Rates in Credit-Card Data May Be on the Way, 
WALL ST. J., May 18, 2000, at A3. The Schumer Box attempts to describe the key terms of the 
loan transaction, including fees, in a more accessible format. See 15 U.S.C. § 1632(c). 
 257. See Lawrence J. Sanna & Norbert Schwarz, Integrating Temporal Biases: The Interplay 
of Focal Thoughts and Accessibility Experiences, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474, 480 (2004) (suggesting 
that consideration of alternative outcomes may fail as a debiasing strategy when the alternatives 
considered are too numerous). 
 258. See supra Part II.B.3.b. 
 259. Such a policy comes at another cost. When large funds pay claimants sooner rather 
than later, they necessarily require more money upfront from defendants, or, with respect to 
public compensation funds, from the government. 
 260. See, e.g., DIXON & STERN, supra note 97, at 41 (describing the strategic, emotional, and 
legal factors that slowed enrollment in the fund). 
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Because of such costs, an asymmetrically paternalistic policy 
would tailor deadlines for different kinds of funds. Rolling deadlines 
and disclosure policies may be more justified in funds that pay high-
value claims, like mass torts and some antitrust settlements, but not 
necessarily those that pay low-value claims, like consumer class 
actions. For high-value claims, the additional savings to the individual 
and the fund justify taking measures to prevent parties who might 
otherwise suboptimally delay filing. Such policies, however, may not 
be justified if the class action settlement involves small claims because 
claimants will not lose much in forgone interest and because such 
funds have shorter filing deadlines. In such cases, disclosure policies 
likely will not be very effective and rolling deadlines would not be 
worth the additional inconvenience they impose on fully rational 
claimants. 
2. Underclaiming.  As discussed in Part II, status quo bias 
explains why many claimants join large settlements, but ultimately fail 
to claim their awards.261 Many public and private settlements require 
additional filings to accept or reject an award.262 Commentators 
studying claim rates in class action settlements have found that the 
fraction of funds actually disbursed was “modest to negligible” in so-
called “claims-made” settlements, in which class members are asked 
to come forward and claim compensation.263 This includes cases in 
which claimants were otherwise entitled to substantial awards.264 As a 
result, although claimants overwhelmingly join public and private 
settlements, many give up legal rights for nothing. 
Class action settlements could reduce underclaiming by 
eliminating choices—a classic insulating strategy. When possible, 
settlement funds could simply eliminate the additional settlement 
choices, and automatically distribute a single award in exchange for 
joining the settlement.265 Such a policy would mitigate decision-
conflict and status quo bias which give rise to underclaiming. That 
 
 261. See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 262. For examples illustrating this proposition, see supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 263. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 458–60 (surveying class action settlements). 
 264. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 1, at 1548–49, 1566 (comparing opt-out rates for 
small, “negative-value” consumer claims with large mass tort claims). 
 265. Some commentators, like Deborah Hensler, have elsewhere described the advantages 
of automatically processing class action settlement claims. See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 
1, at 458–59 (emphasizing the disadvantages of nonautomatic disbursements). 
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system, however, may also unduly limit choices, an outcome that is 
inconsistent with asymmetric paternalism. 
Alternatively, settlement funds could debias claimants. Claim 
forms could describe any failure to return claim forms in terms of 
losses, rather than gains. Studies in decisionmaking have long shown 
that claimants respond more frequently to risks framed as losses than 
to risks framed as gains.266 Recent evidence suggests that reframing 
filing options may encourage people to overcome the status quo bias 
and file more claims.267 
Finally, settlement funds could rebias claimants by automatically 
processing claims yet preserving choice. Under such a system, the 
fund could automatically distribute presumed awards to claimants 
who join the fund but grant claimants an opportunity to reject or 
exchange the presumed award for another settlement option. Any 
automatic payment process would require fund designers to carefully 
assess the default choice. Just like the designers of employer 401(k) 
plans, fund designers would have to assess the default option—a cash 
award or a coupon, a more individualized process or an 
administrative one—understanding that claimants will be influenced 
by the status quo bias. Because of the status quo effect, claimants will 
be much less likely to request an alternative after receiving a check or 
coupon. Such a system, however, would strongly reduce unclaimed 
awards. 
The latter policy would more likely comport with the goals of 
asymmetric paternalism, because a fully rational claimant would be 
able to elect another option. Such a policy, however, would come at a 
cost. Funds would bear the administrative cost of precisely identifying 
eligible claimants in advance of payment.268 Moreover, depending on 
the structure of the fund, defendants may offer lower awards per 
claimant knowing that more claimants will participate in the fund. 
This final concern is less important in light of the overriding goal of 
class action settlements, which is to provide an alternative form of 
legal access to all potential participants.269 
 
 266. See sources cited supra note 133. 
 267. See Saez, supra note 156, at 204–05 (finding, in a study involving sixty branch offices of 
H&R block, that tax filers were more likely to contribute to 401(k) plans when an employer 
subsidy was characterized as a “matching contribution” than as an equivalent tax “rebate”). 
 268. See Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 78, at 660–61 (comparing low-care and high-care 
firms in dealing with cash-coupon remedies). 
 269. For a description of the importance of equity in large settlements, see supra Part I.A. 
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Like rolling deadlines, an asymmetrically paternalistic approach 
to automatic processing would vary based upon the type of the fund. 
Automatic processing will be more justified in welfare benefit 
settlements270 or shareholder class action funds,271 in which the fund 
designers typically have a great deal of information about claimants, 
the awards are modest, and claimants generally do not choose among 
multiple settlement options. Such policies are more problematic in 
large mass tort settlements when awards are large, settlement trusts 
or public settlement funds have less information about potential 
claimants, and claimants may be offered various procedural and 
substantive options in the settlement. In large-value cases, 
automatically processing claims would not be worth the 
administrative cost, the burden on the courts, and the potential for 
error or fraud. 
3. Hearings that Account for Cognitive Bias.  As set out in Part I, 
commentators tout opt-out procedures in large settlements for two 
reasons. First, courts and lawmakers have relied upon claimant 
participation rates as a way to monitor the success of a settlement 
fund. When more people join a fund, courts have held that it is more 
likely that the fund successfully represents claimant interests.272 
Moreover, opt-out rights give claimants a voice in the settlement. 
Commentators argue that claimants should have additional 
opportunities to opt out of the fund at later stages in the settlement, 
particularly when new information about the settlement surfaces.273 
As this Article has explained, however, such examinations may 
systematically underestimate the effects of cognitive bias in individual 
settlement decisions. Absent attorney involvement, people are much 
more likely to stick with funds that require no action, even when the 
costs of switching out of the fund are very low or the potential 
benefits are very high. The default rule—whether claimants must 
affirmatively opt into or opt out of a fund—will, more often than not, 
 
 270. See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, A Bounty of Food Stamps, Harvested from a Lawsuit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2008, at A36 (describing a settlement in which 9,500 class members illegally 
denied food stamps were automatically credited $12 million through the use of electronic 
benefit cards). 
 271. Automatic processing is more feasible in shareholder class actions in which claimants 
are generally not required to choose among multiple settlement awards. Rather, pro-rata 
awards are offered to claimants based upon trading data. See SEC v. Bear Stearns, 626 F. Supp. 
2d 402, 406–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing the practice in shareholder class action settlements). 
 272. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra Part I.D. 
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predict whether claimants decide to join a fund. Accordingly, under 
an asymmetrically paternalistic approach, courts would not consider 
participation rates when evaluating the fairness of an opt-out or opt-
in settlement fund.274 
Moreover, under an asymmetrically paternalistic approach, 
judges should refrain from awarding attorneys’ fees in large class 
settlements offering both cash and coupons.275 Since 2005, the Class 
Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) has required courts to conduct 
“fairness hearings” in coupon-only settlements and to postpone 
decisions about the size of attorneys’ fees until after the coupons have 
been redeemed.276 CAFA’s purpose is to ensure that the attorneys’ 
award is closely connected to the actual value of the settlement to the 
class.277 No similar requirement exists, however, for settlements 
involving both coupons and other options under CAFA.278 Rather, 
courts may award fees based on an estimate of the cash value of the 
settlement that does not involve coupons. Because of contrast biases, 
courts should wait for claimants to redeem coupon-cash settlement 
awards, too. This is because the coupon may have an unexpected 
effect on the other option. The coupon and additional option may 
create decision-conflict, lowering expected claim filings. Or the 
coupon may encourage claimants to accept another settlement option 
that, by comparison, seems to offer a better value or greater liquidity. 
Finally, in rare cases, courts may need to police against the 
improper use of decoy options. Assuming that it is possible for 
counsel to intentionally use a decoy coupon to deter claim filings, it 
may be appropriate for a court to adopt insulating solutions, like 
reviewing settlements for the use of decoys or taking steps to reduce 
an attorney fee award. Because decoy options will not always be 
obvious, courts may need to evaluate the rate at which multiple 
option settlements will be chosen by claimants. Expert testimony in a 
fairness hearing is not, however, novel. Courts have long relied on 
additional expert testimony to evaluate the fairness of a class action 
 
 274. Indeed, the recently released ALI Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation already 
recommends that settlements be evaluated on other considerations. See PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.0 (Tentative Draft 2008). 
 275. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 489 (observing that the monetary value of 
coupons can be estimated because “many defendants use coupons as marketing devices”). 
 276. See supra note 192. 
 277. 28 U.S.C. § 1711(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
 278. Id. § 1712(c). 
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settlement.279 In many such cases, courts will attempt to estimate the 
total value of the settlement to the class and the rates at which parties 
may participate in the settlement.280 
Such additional evaluations are still paternalistic—they assume 
that the claimants’ decision to join the fund was not a meaningful 
decision and try to insulate fairness decisions from such biases. And 
they come at a significant cost to the government and bear a 
significant risk of error.281 Additional controls to police fairness, 
however, like requiring experts to account for cognitive bias when 
evaluating coupon redemption rates, do not unduly restrict rational 
claimants’ interests in liberty or efficiency. 
4. Decoy Options.  Even under an asymmetrically paternalistic 
framework, it is difficult to imagine cases where fund designers could 
properly make use of decoy options to improve claimant 
decisionmaking or reduce administrative costs. It is true that 
claimants may be powerfully influenced by options that they never 
intend to choose.282 Such an approach, however, raises difficult ethical 
and practical concerns. 
For example, a fund designer could explore the benefits of decoy 
settlement options to lower the risk of underclaiming. The fund 
designer could add an additional option that would encourage 
claimants to overcome decision-conflict and file with the fund. Such a 
system presents problems of paternalism, much like the use of 
automatic processing discussed above. Any decoy necessarily 
encourages claimants to view one option more valuably than another. 
Accordingly, the addition of a less valuable coupon to a settlement 
involving both coupons and cash may encourage claimants to choose 
 
 279. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 27, § 21.644 (observing that 
judges may retain special masters, experts, and technical advisors to “examine issues regarding 
the value of non-monetary benefits to the class”); FED. R. EVID. 706 (allowing court 
appointment of experts). 
 280. See, e.g., O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 287 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
(involving a class action against vehicle manufacturers); see also Leslie, supra note 101, at 1082 
(gathering and criticizing methodological approaches used to value class action coupon 
settlements). Such cases have even employed behavioral economists. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors 
Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 807–14 (3d Cir. 1995) (products 
liability); In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1334–38 (N.D. Ga. 
2000) (price-fixing). 
 281. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 27, § 21.644 (observing that 
reviewing the fairness of a settlement is a “time consuming and demanding task” but concluding 
that “it is essential and must be done by the judge”). 
 282. See supra Part II.B.2.b. 
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coupons. A decoy option could encourage claimants to choose more 
administratively inexpensive procedures or more expensive, 
individualized procedures. In either case, just like the design of a 
default option, fund designers would have to exercise careful 
oversight to determine which default option is preferable. 
One could even argue that using decoys this way is arguably less 
intrusive and less costly than automatically processing payments. 
Automatic payments require parties to expend effort to return the 
default award and the fund to expend additional resources identifying 
claimants (and their damages). In contrast, a fully rational person 
would not expend any additional effort ignoring the decoy. Moreover, 
funds could benefit by reducing total administrative costs if the decoy 
effect actually channeled parties into less expensive administrative 
procedures. 
Even assuming that such an approach improves well-being, 
however, employing decoy options to manipulate choice is far more 
insidious than the other proposals discussed in this Section. 
Moreover, the costs of monitoring such a program may outweigh the 
potential benefits. Because the decoy effect is less understood than 
status quo bias, there is a greater risk that settling parties may 
manipulate claimants to accept solutions that claimants would not 
otherwise want. This is a particular concern for class action 
settlements in which, as discussed in Part II, the only check on such 
manipulation is the district court judge. 
For this reason, some commentators recommend adopting a 
“publicity” principle when evaluating the appropriateness of any 
paternalistic solution.283 The publicity principle bars the use of 
government manipulation that it would not be able to otherwise 
defend publicly.284 If a court or public administrator is actually willing 
to disclose, for example, that some options are offered solely to 
improve efficiency, then such an option arguably could be employed. 
If, however, the principle is to deceive claimants into selecting awards 
to save defendants money or to discourage claimants from filing at all, 
such a proposal could not be defended. 
Decoy options may steer claimants to select undesirable 
settlement options. As a result, courts and policymakers should 
recognize the impact that one settlement option may have on the 
 
 283. See SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 33, at 246–49 (advocating that transparency in the 
form of publicity is key to evaluating paternalistic solutions). 
 284. Id. at 247 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)). 
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selection of other options. It is unlikely, however, that the potential 
benefits of affirmatively exploiting such a poorly understood bias to 
manipulate outcomes will outweigh the costs. 
* * * 
Funding irrationality promises real benefits. Such procedures 
may encourage claimants to file earlier, more often, and in ways that 
are more equitable than if a settlement fund were not adjusted to 
account for cognitive bias. All such solutions, however, vary in 
effectiveness and pose different costs to claimant autonomy, to the 
administration of the fund, and in some cases, to other rational 
claimants. Fund designers must balance the effectiveness of such 
procedures against the possibility that they will unduly eliminate 
settlement options or impose excessive administrative costs. 
C. Objections 
There are several potential objections to the use of procedures 
designed to correct for cognitive error.285 The proposed solutions 
discussed in this Part already attempt to account for potential costs. 
Three additional objections—the “bad fund designer problem,” the 
“autonomy problem,” and the “wash-out” problem—are addressed in 
turn. 
1. Bad Fund Designers.  One objection is that fund designers may 
have incentives to adopt procedures that benefit lawyers, judges, and 
administrators more than claimants. As demonstrated in Part I, many 
commentators have criticized large settlement funds for just such 
principal-agent problems.286 Lawyers may be more interested in 
maximizing their own fees than representing their clients. Judges may 
be more interested in ensuring that unrecovered funds go to their 
favorite charity. Administrators may be more concerned with clearing 
case loads than providing claimants with adequate process. Even 
proponents of “libertarian paternalism” do not recommend 
 
 285. For general criticisms of the “paternalistic” use of biases to sway human 
decisionmaking, see Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of 
Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 (2006); Mario J. Rizzo & 
Douglas Glen Whitman, Paternalist Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 411 (2007); Glen 
Whitman, Against the New Paternalism: Internalities and the Economics of Self-Control, CATO 
INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, Feb. 22, 2006, at 1. 
 286. See supra Part I.C.1. 
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paternalistic solutions when a situation “contains special risks of self-
dealing.”287 
Moreover, there is some evidence that fund designers also may 
be subject to cognitive bias themselves.288 Scholars argue that public 
officials lack incentives to correct cognitive error because they are not 
directly affected by bad decisions.289 Others observe that judges and 
administrators rarely receive feedback on their decisions.290 
There are two answers to this objection. First, cognitive bias is 
unavoidable in settlement funds. Conflicted fund designers already 
have the power to misuse bias, and, as demonstrated in Parts II and 
III, cognitive bias will infect cognitive decisionmaking even if fund 
designers ignore its effects. Moreover, because claimants rarely make 
settlement decisions, there will not be many opportunities for 
claimants to learn how to make better decisions in a settlement fund. 
At a minimum, policymakers and judges can seek to evaluate the 
effects of cognitive bias, transparently account for bias when it 
appears in the design of settlement funds, and attempt to adjust rules 
in a way that imposes low costs on other claimants to the fund. 
Second, the potential for bad fund designers is one reason why 
fund designers should maintain choices, when possible. Although this 
Article argues that claimants will be less willing to take advantage of 
their options than others suggest, it does not dispute that choice can 
serve as an important safety-valve and check against self-dealing fund 
designers. 
2. The Autonomy Problem.  Another potential objection is that 
such solutions rob people of “litigant autonomy”—the right to be 
“wrong” or to value settlements in unpredictable ways.291 This Article 
 
 287. SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 33, at 251. 
 288. See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs About Adjudicated Outcomes: 
Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 289, 296–97 (1995) 
(finding that framing effects had a similar impact on lawyer and nonlawyer subjects); Marjorie 
Anne McDiarmid, Lawyer Decision Making: The Problem of Prediction, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 
1847, 1868–75 (worrying that lawyers’ decisionmaking is also affected by cognitive bias); 
Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 1217 n.274 (collecting studies demonstrating lawyers’ cognitive 
biases). 
 289. Edward Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 144 (2006) 
(“Consumers face stronger incentives to correct errors that directly impact their well-being than 
do government bureaucrats.”). 
 290. Rachlinkski, supra note 9, at 1220. 
 291. See Amir & Lobel, supra note 236, at 2126 (“The fact is that human beings come into 
the world with a passion for control, they go out of the world the same way, and research 
suggests that if they lose their ability to control things at any point between their entrance and 
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has assumed that, absent irrationality, every individual would agree 
that greater returns on their claims are better than alternatives 
affected by cognitive bias.292 This may not always be the case, 
however. In individual settlements, a divorce lawyer may feel that a 
client is willing to give away too much because of the context of the 
decision; the client may be eager to exit his or her marriage or may be 
tired of the process. But whether this is a bad decision for the client is 
hard for someone other than the client to say. 
This Article does not dispute that these reforms impact client 
autonomy. Rather, this Article assumes that policies behind large 
settlement funds—more access, efficiency, and equity in claim 
value—will inevitably require fund designers to take a stand that may 
be inconsistent with some claimants’ valuation of a settlement. The 
point is to adopt measures that improve the welfare of as many 
claimants as possible, consistent with these goals, while minimizing 
harm to others. To the extent that cognitive biases undermine these 
goals, it is appropriate to examine their effects, and when the costs 
are low, to intervene to encourage different outcomes. 
3. The Wash-Out Problem.  Finally, many commentators have 
warned that correcting biases can be extremely difficult.293 Those who 
manipulate biases run the risk of not only paternalism, but also of 
overcompensating or supplanting one bias with another undesirable 
response.294 For example, using automatic claim filing processes to 
take advantage of the status quo bias, may have a reactive effect, 
causing people to consider the original opt-out option more or less 
carefully.295 Similarly, providing alternative representations of 
different decisions may help people overcome decoy effects, but may 
also induce decision-conflict.296 Adopting policies that prevent 
procrastination may induce nonprocrastinators to file earlier than 
they would like. 
 
their exit, they become unhappy, helpless, hopeless, and depressed.”); Rizzo & Whitman, supra 
note 285, at 411. 
 292. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 18, at 23 (arguing that, “if individuals do not 
understand their well-being,” their argument applies to “actual well-being—what they would 
prefer if they correctly understood how they would be affected”). 
 293. E.g., Amir & Lobel, supra note 236, at 2116; Arlen, supra note 16, at 1769; Jolls & 
Sunstein, supra note 33, at 225–35; Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 1168. 
 294. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 227. 
 295. Amir & Lobel, supra note 236, at 2116 (describing “reactive effects” of redesigning 
default options in national organ donation plans). 
 296. Id. (describing “reactive effects” to decoy ploys). 
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These problems do not undermine the case for adopting 
procedures that help claimants make better decisions in funds. If a 
particular procedure works for many people and imposes few costs on 
others, then it should be adopted. Such problems, however, do mean 
that fund designers should be sensitive to the “cognitive costs” of a 
particular solution. As Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski writes: “Just as 
parties negotiate around transaction costs, they adapt around 
cognitive impediments to good judgment.”297 Paternalistic constraints 
on choice cannot be justified absent a showing that the “costs of 
privately developing better ways to make choices” are greater than 
the benefit of a legal intervention.298 Nonetheless, large funds merit 
special examination and legal intervention precisely because there are 
so few opportunities for claimants to privately develop better ways to 
make such choices. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article begins a discussion about a relatively unexplored 
topic in the literature of large settlement funds. Over the past fifty 
years, public and private actors have expanded their efforts to 
compensate groups of people for collectively experienced harm. Class 
action settlement funds and public settlement funds are just two 
prominent examples of this trend. But large funds exist in many other 
areas of the law—in criminal restitution actions, state victim 
compensation programs, insurance funds, and emergency and 
international relief.299 
 
 297. Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 1225. 
 298. Id. 
 299. One recent example is the fund developed to compensate former investors of Bernard 
Madoff. Three separate agencies will be responsible for collecting funds on behalf of victims—
the Securities Investment Protection Corporation (“SIPC”), an agency charged with insuring 
accounts with brokers and dealers, the United States Attorneys Office, which sought criminal 
restitution awards against Madoff, and the SEC, which continues to seek civil disgorgement 
awards against those who may have abetted Mr. Madoff. See Patrick Danner & Martha 
Brannigan, Madoff’s Victims Still Pursue Justice, Money, MIAMI HERALD, July 6, 2009, at 1A 
(quoting an SEC spokesperson who declared that “[e]verything the SEC collects will be for the 
benefit of investors”). On December 15, 2008, the Securities Investment Protection Corporation 
moved to liquidate Mr. Madoff’s fifty-year-old firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, 
and will oversee the distribution of most of those collected funds. See Securities Investor 
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3) (2006) (permitting the appointment of a trustee and 
removal to bankruptcy court when a debtor is unable to meet his obligations to investors); see 
also Trustee’s First Interim Report for the Period December 11, 2008 Through June 30, 2009, 
No. 08-1789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y filed July 9, 2009), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/ 
packages/pdf/business/Interim.pdf (summarizing bankruptcy court proceedings, objections to 
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In the literature that has accompanied and, in some cases, 
criticized the growth of such funds, many commentators have 
addressed ways to improve either (1) public oversight of such funds 
or (2) the incentives of private actors—like plaintiffs counsel—to 
adequately represent and serve large groups of people.300 As Part I of 
this Article explains, one popular way to accomplish both goals has 
been to increase people’s choices. More opportunities to opt out of a 
large fund ensure, at least theoretically, that the fund represents the 
interests of those who do not. More choices of settlement processes 
and outcomes means claimants will be more satisfied with their final 
awards. More time to decide assures claimants that they will arrive at 
a decision that reflects their interests. Notwithstanding the focus on 
improving choice, however, relatively little study has been devoted to 
the way people make those choices. Modern reform efforts, rather, 
have assumed that claimants make rational decisions about their 
options. 
This Article does not challenge efforts to increase choices and 
opportunities for claimants to large funds. It does, however, question 
whether such efforts, by themselves, are enough to accomplish their 
objectives of greater fairness, efficiency, and equity. Although such 
measures better ensure that rational participants may monitor, object, 
and exclude themselves from such funds, few measures exist to 
protect the vast majority of claimants who will make decisions based 
upon cognitive error. As this Article has demonstrated, there will be 
cases in which, on balance, many subjects make even poorer decisions 
for themselves and the fund as a whole when available settlement 
options are not adjusted to account for cognitive biases. This is, in 
part, because in many large funds parties lack individual access to 
third-party expertise, like lawyers. Given the tremendous economic, 
social, and institutional resources devoted to operating large funds, it 
is worth asking: short of providing each claimant with individual 
counsel, can funds be designed in smarter ways? Can they 
accommodate both rational and irrational decisionmaking? 
This Article answers “yes,” by recommending an asymmetrically 
paternalistic approach to reforming large settlement funds. 
Asymmetric paternalism favors policies that benefit those prone to 
 
claims determinations, and claims administration for the first six months of the bankruptcy trust 
operation); Diana B. Henriques, It’s Thankless, But He Decides Madoff Claims, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 29, 2009, at A1 (describing the disputed method for paying claims). 
 300. See supra Part I.C–D. 
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make cognitive errors, while minimizing costs to those who otherwise 
choose rationally. In so doing, this Article recommends accounting 
for and sometimes exploiting the timing, structure, and combination 
of options in large settlements to increase the welfare of all potential 
participants. Such solutions raise fundamental questions of fairness 
and efficiency themselves: Will fund designers suffer from their own 
biases? Will procedures that fund irrationality limit claimants’ rights 
to control their own litigation or impose excessive costs? Will funding 
irrationality risk replacing one set of claimant biases with new biases 
that lead to even less desirable outcomes? These are all valid 
concerns. The compensatory goals of large funds require, however, 
that we understand how claimants make choices and, when possible, 
adjust rules so that funds better serve them. 
